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Abstract
This thesis provides four contributions to the literature on the productivity-
internationalization nexus by considering some recent developments in the literature.
A well-established stylized fact is reported by this literature, which is that exporters
are more productive and larger than non-exporters, and two hypotheses attempt
to explain this finding. The first, often referred to as the self-selection hypothesis,
suggests that more productive firms select themselves into export markets, while the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis highlights the role of learning from exporting.
In this thesis, first, the self-selection hypothesis is revisited, and it is shown that
evidence against self-selection exists in some UK industries. Second, it is demon-
strated that some UK firms experience rising marginal costs, although both tra-
ditional and new trade theories assume constant marginal cost. It is then shown
that the evidence against self-selection that we report can be best explained by the
existence of increasing, rather than constant, marginal costs.
Third, the learning by exporting hypothesis is tested empirically for UK firms.
Highlighting the importance of the scale effect in total factor productivity growth,
it is shown that any learning by exporting effects are predominantly attributable to
a change in scale efficiency.
Unlike Melitz (2003), some recent studies consider some other strategies to access
foreign markets, such as foreign direct investment, and cross-border mergers. Finally,
following this new branch of the literature, the productivity-internationalization
nexus is examined by utilizing a two-country oligopolistic model. It is shown that
more productive firm might prefer greenfield investment over cross-border merger,
which contradicts the findings provided by the relevant literature.
Key words: Firm heterogeneity, self-selection, learning by exporting, cross-
border mergers, matching, dynamic probit models
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
Over the last two decades, the availability of new large datasets has allowed
economists to examine several economic issues at firm-level.1 Many empirical studies
utilizing these datasets report some interesting findings, in particular that firms are
heterogeneous in terms of their productivity and size, and the wage rates they pay.2
These studies have also discovered that firms’ participation behaviour in interna-
tional trade is not random, and there are quite a few exporting and importing firms
relative to the number of domestic producers.3 More importantly, it is suggested
that exporters are more productive and larger than non-exporting firms. Although
the majority of the empirical studies in the literature confirm that exporters are
more productive than non-exporters, the causality in this relationship is not well-
explained. For this reason, the greater part of the related literature mainly focuses
on this issue.
Two principal non-exclusive hypotheses attempt to explain this relationship.
First, the self-selection hypothesis suggests that more productive firms select them-
selves into export markets. One possible reason for this is that there is an additional
cost of selling goods to foreign countries and only the most productive firms are
able to afford these costs.4 Another explanation for the self-selection mechanism
1As Caves (1998) states, researchers were unable to access the firm-level database from the
national census bureaux or statistical institutes until the end of the 1990s. Nowadays, in addition
to countries’ statistical institutes, some commercial databases are another option for researchers
who want to use firm-level data.
2Following Bernard and Jensen (1999) several empirical studies document similar findings.
3Wagner (2007) provides a survey of the recent empirical studies in this literature.
4This cost is known as a sunk cost, and it consists of transportation costs, distribution or
marketing costs, or the cost of the skilled workers who are needed to deal with foreign networks
(Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Melitz, 2003).
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is proposed by Aw and Hwang (1995), who suggest that export market entry im-
plies being exposed to fierce product competition, which only more productive firms
can deal with. The second hypothesis points to the role of learning-by-exporting
which suggests that those firms entering the export market enjoy an improvement
in productivity even after the entry has taken place. In theory, firms operating in
international markets could benefit from exporting as a result of a technological ex-
change with their international rivals and clients. Moreover, exporters face pressure
to improve their production techniques in order to meet high requirements arising
from intense competition in the international markets, and this process, as a con-
sequence, may cause productivity improvements (Aw, Chung and Roberts, 2000).
On top of that, exporters could benefit from economies of scale that result from the
production capacity improvements determined by the international demand. Thus,
in the presence of economies of scales and/or technology transfers, one would expect
to observe improvements in the post-entry performance, which verify the learning
by exporting hypothesis (LBE) (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998).
The aim of this thesis is to examine the productivity-internationalization nexus
by using an empirical approach as well as theoretical modelling. Thus, we revisit
both self-selection and the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in the light of some re-
cent developments in the international trade literature. The rest of this introduction
proceeds by i) further outlining some relevant themes in the literature, and ii) pro-
viding a more detailed summary of each chapter.
1.1.1 Self-Selection, Learning-by-Exporting or Both?
The new findings described above have triggered a growing amount of literature
on heterogeneous firms, which is ignored (or not considered) by traditional trade
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theory.5 In this sub-section, we provide a quick review of some important studies in
order to describe how these new results are handled by the literature.
In the light of the findings mentioned above, the seminal paper of Melitz (2003)
provides a theoretical framework of international trade that accounts for firm het-
erogeneity. Melitz (2003), and the subsequent works (which are called “new” new
trade models), extend Krugman’s (1980) framework by considering firm heterogene-
ity where firms differ in terms of their marginal productivity of labour. Melitz (2003)
utilizes a monopolistic competition game to show that more efficient firms self-select
into the export market, while less efficient firms serve only the domestic market, and
the least efficient ones stop producing. Consequently, since the least efficient firms
are eliminated, aggregate industry productivity increases as a result of a change in
the industry composition, as well as resource allocation towards more productive
firms. Following Melitz (2003), many empirical studies using firm-level data from
different countries around the world have examined the causality between export
and firm productivity, and the majority of them confirm the predictions of Melitz
(2003).
The relationship between export and growth, especially export-led growth, is
a well-established finding at the macro level (Edwards, 1993). As we mentioned,
over the last few years, the focus of international trade studies has shifted from
industries and countries to firms and plants.6 For this reason, at the micro level,
the literature on the links between exports and firm-level productivity is new and
growing. Following the increasing availability of firm-level data, after the mid-1990s,
several studies examined the productivity enhancing effect of export at firm level.
Although there are an extensive number of studies on this issue, the evidence on the
learning by exporting (LBE) effect is mixed and still unclear. (Wagner, 2007).
5Neither the Ricardian and the Heckscher-Ohlin trade models, nor Krugman trade models con-
sider firm heterogeneity.
6In fact, this is a consequence of the limited availability of data until mid 1990s.
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Despite some substantial studies, the results provided by the literature, in this
regard, are far from being consolidated. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is
to revisit the relationship between firm productivity and the foreign market entry
mode by addressing some recent developments in the literature that we highlight
in the following section. In addition, we utilize some recently available econometric
methods that tackle some important problems that previous studies have suffered
from.
1.2. Some Recent Developments in the Literature on
Heterogeneous Firms and Trade
1.2.1 Constant Marginal Cost Assumption
Although the new generation trade models relax the homogenous firms assump-
tion of the existing trade models, they maintain some restrictive assumptions, such
as constant marginal costs. Under the constant marginal costs assumption, firms
maximize their profits in domestic and foreign markets independently of each other.
This means that in response to a positive export demand shock, firms do not alter
their level of domestic sales, since the level of production has no effect on the level of
marginal cost. In other words, domestic and export sales are independent for firms
experiencing constant marginal costs. On the other hand, for a firm producing with
increasing marginal costs, it will be optimal to reduce its domestic sales in order to
meet the increased export demand, as the marginal cost of production increases.7
Both traditional and new trade models consider the constant marginal cost of pro-
duction. However, some recent empirical studies have challenged this assumption.
7Please see Figures A1.1 and A1.2 in Appendix 1 Section A for a diagrammatic illustration
of the effect of a positive demand shock on a firm’s output under both constant, and increasing
marginal cost assumptions.
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Vannoorenberghe (2012), for example, reports a pattern of a negative correlation
between the output variation in the domestic and export markets for French firms.
Blum, Carlo and Horstmann (2013) also show a robust relationship between export
and domestic sales for Chilean firms, and conclude that those firms face increasing
marginal costs. Additionally, they suggest that this issue arises from the physical ca-
pacity constraints of firms, which prevent them from maximizing profits in domestic
and foreign markets independently of each other.
We believe that these new findings cast doubt on the constant marginal cost
assumption of the trade models, and we address this issue in Chapter 2, where we
revisit the predictions of Melitz (2003) for UK firms.
In the following subsection we address some further developments in the trade
literature that seek to incorporate FDI as a mode of foreign market entry into het-
erogeneous firm models.
1.2.2 Heterogeneous Nature of FDI
Although initially, the literature considered exporting as the only way access to
foreign markets (as in Melitz, 2003), Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004) extend this
framework by modelling two ways to serve the foreign markets: export, and foreign
direct investment (FDI). In their paper, Helpman et al. (2004) show that only the
most productive firms within an industry engage in FDI, while the less efficient
firms serve the foreign market via exports, and the least productive firms sell only
to domestic market or stop producing.
In reality, FDI consists of both greenfield investment and cross-border merger.8
However, the vast majority of the literature considers FDI as greenfield investment,
8Firms internationalize their production process via foreign direct investment, which takes a
form of either cross-border merger or greenfield investment. Greenfield investment provides an
improvement in the host country’s capital stock, while cross-border mergers cause a change in the
ownership of an existing firm in the host country (Ferrett, 2005).
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and has neglected its heterogeneous nature.9 Recently, the increasing importance of
cross-border mergers has triggered a new and growing body of literature that can
be considered as an extension to the existing literature on FDI. Some recent papers,
such as those of Ferrett (2005), Bjorvatn (2004), Nocke and Yeaple (2007), Neary
(2009), and Stepanok (2015) explicitly model cross-border merger, and greenfield
investment as components of FDI.
1.2.3 Motives for Cross-Border Merger
The traditional Industrial Organization (IO) literature provides two motives for
mergers: an efficiency motive and a strategic motive. Efficiency gains might arise
from transferring technology, cost savings or managerial synergies, while a strategic
motive is associated with the competition reducing effect of merger (Neary, 2002). A
group of papers in the literature, such as that of Neary (2009), focus on the strategic
motive for mergers, while some other groups of studies, such as that of Nocke and
Yeaple (2007), consider an efficiency motive as a key factor for mergers. We provide
a detailed analysis with regard to this issue in Chapter 4.
In Nocke and Yeaple (2007), firms are heterogeneous in terms of their interna-
tionally mobile, and non-mobile capabilities, and they operate in a monopolistically
competitive market, where the available strategies for firms to access to a foreign
market are: export, greenfield investment, and cross-border merger. They consider
that acquiring firms’ main motivation for undertaking a cross-border merger is to
exploit complementaries when combining firm-specific capabilities, and they confirm
the so-called productivity ranking in FDI literature.10 However, since they consider
monopolistic competition in their model, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) fail to take any
9Studies, such as that of Head and Riese (2003); Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004); and
Yeaple, (2005), mainly explore the well-known proximity-concentration trade-off between greenfield
investment and export.
10Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004)
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strategic motives in to account for cross-border mergers.
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that focus on the issues mentioned
above. Now, I will provide some detailed information about how I investigate these
issues in this thesis.
1.3. A Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides an empirical analysis of the prediction of Melitz (2003), who
suggests that the more productive firms self-select into the export market. Basically,
we examine the self-selection hypothesis for UK firms by using a panel dataset cover-
ing the period between 2003 and 2011. We test the self-selection hypothesis by using
both pooled data where all firms from different industries are included, and indus-
try level data. By doing this, we aim to show that the results for the self-selection
hypothesis may differ when we consider industry-specific differences. Furthermore,
following the recent developments in the literature, we examine whether UK firms
really experience a constant marginal cost of production. To do this, we analyse the
relationship between the average growth in sales in domestic and foreign markets for
each industry.
As discussed earlier, two principal non-exclusive hypotheses attempt to explain
the fact that exporters are more productive than non-exporters. In Chapter 2, ex-
istence of a causality running from productivity to export decision is examined,
while in Chapter 3 we present an analysis of the effect of exporting on productivity
growth. The literature on learning by exporting focuses on three potential sources
of learning: technology transfer, competition, and economies of scale. In Chapter 3,
we highlight the importance of the scale effect in the learning-by-exporting analy-
sis, which is overlooked by many recent UK studies. In these studies, the effect of
scale is ignored, since it is assumed to be zero under the constant returns to scale
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assumption. Thus, we aim to uncover the potential importance of the scale effect
in the learning by exporting analysis by examining whether or not UK firms really
experience constant returns to scale. Moreover, in order to be able to single out the
scale effect, we examine the different channels through which exporting influences
TFP growth, by decomposing it into its components, namely technical change, scale
change, and efficiency change.
By following Melitz (2003), in Chapters 2 and 3 we consider that export is the
only way to sell abroad. However, in reality, firms have further available strategies to
access foreign markets. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) take this into account,
and extend the work of Melitz (2003) by including foreign direct investment as an
alternative way to export. However, this time Helpman et al. (2004) failed to
explain the heterogeneous nature of foreign direct investment. More precisely, there
are two options for a firm aiming to invest in foreign markets: cross-border mergers,
and greenfield investment. However, the heterogeneous composition of foreign direct
investment is largely neglected by the relevant literature. Some recent papers, on
the other hand, such as that of Ferrett (2005), Bjorvatn (2004), and Nocke and
Yeaple (2007) explicitly model the two different components of FDI to examine the
internationalization decisions of firms.
By following Nocke and Yeaple (2007), in Chapter 4, we focus on the relationship
between firm level productivity, and a firm’s decision on foreign market entry. To do
this, we utilize a two-country oligopolistic model of differentiated product competi-
tion with heterogeneous firms, where firms compete in the home country’s market
via export, greenfield investment or cross-border merger. Unlike Nocke and Yeaple
(2007), in Chapter 4, we consider both an efficiency motive and a strategic motive
for cross-border mergers.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a conclusion and a summary of our findings. It also
suggests some potential future research topics that follow on from the thesis.
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Chapter 2: Self-Selection to Export: Understanding
the Evidence and Impact of Increasing Marginal
Cost
2.1. Introduction
Following Bernard and Jensen (1999) several empirical studies document that
in an industry, some firms export, while other firms operate only in the domestic
market. Additionally, it is reported that firms are heterogeneous: Exporters are
more productive, larger, and they pay higher wages compared to non-exporters.
In response to these findings, a new literature has emerged which examines the
determinants behind this evidence.
The seminal paper of Melitz (2003) provides a theoretical framework of interna-
tional trade that accounts for firm heterogeneity. Melitz (2003) is built on Krugman’s
(1980) framework, considering firm heterogeneity where firms differ in terms of their
marginal productivity of labour: he shows that more productive firms self-select to
enter the export market. Following this, a large number of empirical studies have
examined the findings of Melitz (2003), which is referred to as the self-selection hy-
pothesis, and the vast majority of these studies confirm a causal link between firm
productivity and a firm’s decision to exporting.
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Although Melitz (2003) and subsequent works relax the homogenous firms as-
sumption of the existing trade models, they maintain some restrictive assumptions,
such as constant marginal costs which implies that firms maximize profits in domes-
tic and foreign markets independently of each other. On the other hand, for a firm
producing with increasing marginal costs, the optimal approach will be to reduce its
domestic sales in order to meet the increased export demand, as the marginal cost
of production increases. For this reason, we believe that the constant marginal costs
assumption plays a key role in the analysis of the self-selection hypothesis.
This chapter focuses on this restrictive assumption of constant marginal costs and
revisits the literature on self-selection hypothesis. We report a set of very interesting
findings suggesting that firms in some important UK industries produce with rising
marginal cost. In relation to this, we also show that the self-selection hypothesis
does not hold for the very same UK manufacturing industries, where firms face
rising marginal cost.
In this chapter, we firstly revisit the prediction of Melitz (2003) regarding the
relationship between firm level productivity and the decision to export for UK man-
ufacturing firms. Like most of the previous literature, we start our analysis with a
dataset where all industries are pooled, and show that more productive UK firms
self-select themselves into foreign markets.1 It is a well-known fact that each industry
has different characteristics. For instance, as we report in this chapter, firms in some
industries produce at constant marginal costs, while some other industries face in-
creasing marginal costs. In order to account for such differences between industries,
we test the self-selection hypothesis again, but this time for each industry. Eventu-
ally, we show that our findings do not strongly confirm the self-selection hypothesis
for some important industries. We find that self-selection occurs in some industries,
1However, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) criticize this approach by stating that “... the common
procedure of pooling industries in regression analysis is inappropriate as the mapping from firm
characteristics to mode choices differs qualitatively across industries in a systematic fashion.”
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such as Textiles/Cloth/Leather, and Other Manufacturing, while we find evidence
against it in some others, such as Non-metal Minerals and Motor vehicles/parts.
More importantly, we show that the average rates of sales growth in domestic
and foreign markets are negatively correlated in many industries, in a way that is
consistent with increasing marginal cost. This negative correlation suggests that
optimal output levels in each individual market are not independent of the other
market for firms in some important industries, such as Non-metal Minerals and
Motor vehicles/parts. We beleive that these findings raise doubts about the constant
marginal costs assumption of both the standard and new trade models. Finally, we
show a pattern suggesting that self-selection does not occur in the UK industries
where firms produce at increasing marginal cost.
In this chapter we also benefit from two recent methodological developments in
the literature. First, most of the early examples in this literature, such as Clerides,
Lach and Tybout (1998) or Bernard and Jensen (1999) use labour productivity
(value-added per worker) as a proxy for firm productivity, although it is admitted
that labour productivity is not a true measure of total factor productivity (Clarides
et al., 1998). Following recent improvements in econometric techniques, total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) became preferable to labour productivity as a measure of
efficiency (Harris, 2005). For this reason, to examine the self-selection hypothesis,
we compute firm level TFP as residuals from a Cobb-Douglas production function.2
Second, another important issue with the self-selection analysis is related to the sunk
cost effect. As Melitz (2003) suggests, the sunk cost effect is one of the key factors
behind the self-selection hypothesis.3 Surprisingly, many empirical studies ignore
this effect when it comes to self-selection analysis. Sunk cost is represented by the
previous year’s export status in a regression equation. However, including the previ-
2See section 2.3.
3According to Melitz (2003), the most productive firms self-select themselves to enter the export
market, since only such firms can overcome the sunk cost of exporting activity.
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ous year’s export status (as a lagged dependent variable) causes serious econometric
problems that we describe in section 2.5.3. We tackle these problems by employing
the dynamic probit model proposed by Wooldridge (2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of
related literature, while section 2.3 explains the methodology used for the estimation
of total factor productivity (TFP). Section 2.4 describes the data we use in this
analysis and shows some descriptive evidence of the difference between exporter and
non-exporter firms in terms of some firm characteristics. Section 2.5 describes the
framework of the econometric analysis, and Section 2.6 provides our results. In
section 2.7 we provide robustness check results, and finally, Section 2.8 provides the
conclusion.
2.2. Related Literature
Two principal non-exclusive hypotheses attempt to explain the fact that exporters
are more productive than firms that operate only in domestic markets: namely the
self-selection hypothesis and learning-by-exporting. In this chapter, we focus mainly
on the self-selection hypothesis, while we will examine the learning by exporting
hypothesis for UK manufacturing firms in the third chapter of the thesis.
This chapter contributes to the literature on the endogenous selection of hetero-
geneous firms into the export market. The seminal paper of Melitz (2003), which
is a key paper in this literature, followed by many empirical studies which examine
the well-established empirical association between export and productivity by using
different econometric techniques on different datasets. One can say that the self-
selection hypothesis is largely confirmed. However, similar to our study, some recent
studies, such as Lu (2010), Lu et al. (2010), and Yang and He (2013) find evidence
against self-selection from their data. They report a productivity puzzle suggesting
12
that Chinese exporting firms are overall less productive than non-exporters. Unlike
our paper, these studies try to explain this productivity puzzle with local protections,
an export spillover effect, and factor endowment heterogeneities between countries.
Many UK studies examining the the self-selection hypothesis, such as Harris and
Li (2008), and Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2003), report evidence in favour of self-
selection. However, although Melitz (2003) shows the importance of the sunk cost
of exporting when it comes to the decision to export, these studies overlook the
sunk cost effect. Instead, we take the sunk cost of export into account explicitly
by considering the previous year’s export status as a measure of the sunk cost of
exporting. Doing this, we tackle a very important econometric issue that may harm
our estimations.4 There are other studies that take the previous year’s export status
into account by utilizing a dynamic panel estimation method, such as Greenaway,
Kneller and Zhang (2007), and Temouri, Vogel, and Wagner (2013); they do not
confirm the self-selection hypothesis for UK firms. However, these studies use labour
productivity as a measure of firm-level productivity, while we use total factor pro-
ductivity.5 Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007) is the closest to our study.
They examine a relationship between some financial factors and export decisions,
by using the same database that we use for our study.6 Employing dynamic GMM
to deal with the endogeneity problem, they do not find any evidence for more pro-
ductive firms self-selecting to enter the export market. Unlike these studies, in this
chapter we provide more detailed information regarding self-selection at the industry
level, where we even report evidence against the self-selection mechanism. Moreover,
unlike the previous UK studies, we also consider the rising marginal cost, and its
implications.
4See section 2.5 for details.
5In Section 2.3 we explain some advantages of TFP as a measure of productivity compared to
labour productivity.
6They use FAME data for the period 1993-2003, while our data covers the period between
2003-2011.
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Our work is also related to a new and growing literature which challenges the
constant marginal cost assumption of Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) by explor-
ing the relationship between domestic and export sales. Some recent papers such as
Nguyen and Schaur (2011), Ahn and McQuoid (2012), and Vannoorenberghe (2012)
argue for such a relationship between domestic and export sales at firm level for
Danish, Indonesian, Chilean, and French firms. Eventually, these studies conclude
that the real world data from different countries do not support the assumption of
constant marginal cost which is heavily used in the literature: instead, they suggest
that firms in their dataset produce at increasing marginal cost. In contrast to our
study, this literature mainly concerns the determinants of rising marginal cost, while
we examine the endogenous selection of heterogeneous firms into the export market.
One exception is the paper by Blum, Carlo and Horstmann (2013), which exam-
ines export entry and exit behaviour of occasional exporters without addressing the
self-selection phenomenon.
2.3. Estimation of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Most studies that analyze TFP assume that production takes a form of a Cobb-
Douglas production function.7 A standard Cobb-Douglas production function is
given by:
Yi = F (Ai, Ki, Li) = AiK
 k
i L
bl
i (2.1)
where Yi, Li and Ki denote firm i’s output, labor input, and physical capital
stock respectively. In the literature, labour input is usually measured by the num-
ber of employment or the numbers of hours worked, while output is measured as
value-added or gross output.8 Ai is a measure of firm-level efficiency that cannot be
7However, as suggested by Ackerberg et al. (2007), the estimation methods that we will analyze
in this part of the study are applicable to the other types of production functions.
8As Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) highlighted, there is an inconclusive literature on the supe-
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observed by the researcher, while Yi, Li and Ki are all observable. Ai is commonly
known as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and it is assumed that this term includes
all unobserved determinants of output. It is assumed that the effect of Ai on Yi is
Hicks-neutral, which implies that TFP is additively separable from the other pro-
duction factors in log-linearized form (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). Finally,  l,
and  k denote output elasticities of labour and capital, respectively. Taking natural
logs of equation (2.1) we obtain the following equation to estimate:
yit =  llit +  kkit +  0 + "it (2.2)
where t is time subscript (t = 1, ....., T ), and lower case letters are log values
of the variables introduced above. In equation (2.2), ln(Ai) is represented by the
combination of two elements;  0 and eit, where  0 denotes mean efficiency level across
firms over time, and eit represents deviations from that mean for specific firms and
times. eit can be decomposed further to predictable and unobservable components
that are nit and uit, where uit is an i.i.d. error component, and nit is the productivity
term.9 Eventually, this gives us the following equation:
yit =  llit +  kkit +  0 + nit + uit (2.3)
where firm-level TFP (!it) is represented by the sum of b0, and nit. Typically,
equation (2.3) is estimated and solved for wit. Then, estimated TFP can be calculated
as:
ln ˆTFPit = !ˆit = vˆit + b 0 = yit    ˆllit    ˆkkit (2.4)
As we already mentioned, labour productivity is not a preferred productivity
measure because of its limitations (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). More precisely,
riority of the value-added and gross output-based specifications.
9Here, uit represents either measurement error or a non-predictable productivity shock (van
Beveren, 2012).
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we can show labour productivity growth by subtracting the logarithm of employment
from both sides of equation (2.4). If we differentiate equation (2.4) with respect to
time we get:
y˙   l˙ = ( ˆl   1)l˙ + bˆlk˙ + ln ˙TFP
where y˙  l˙ represents labour productivity. The equation above shows that labour
productivity is determined not just by differences in efficiency and technical changes,
but also changes in factor inputs themselves. An increase in labour productivity is
negatively related to an increase in employment (where (bˆl   1) < 0), and positively
related to the capital stock. Thus, TFP is preferred to labour productivity as a proxy
for firm productivity, since it does not depend on the production factors (Harris and
Li, 2008).
In Appendix 1 Section B, we provide a detailed discussion with regard to some
econometric issues arising from estimating equation (2.4). We also review some
methods used in the literature to overcome those issues. Based on our review, in
this study, we have decided to use a semi-parametric method proposed by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) to estimate equation (2.4).
2.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.4.1 Data
In this study we use FAME firm-level database, which includes all manufacturing
firms operating in the UK that are required to register their accounts at Companies’
House.10 The FAME database contains information on many variables appearing in
a firm balance sheet, such as number of employees, intermediate expenditure, total
10The Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) dataset is a commercially available UK company-
level panel data published by Bureau van Dijk. I am very grateful to the University Manchester
Main Library for providing me with access to the dataset.
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turnover, assets, and overseas sales.11 In addition to the financial information, FAME
also provides information on the geographical location (UK regions) that firms are
established, year of incorporation of the company, and 4-digit 2007 SIC industry
code.
Since many small firms in the UK are exempt from reporting their annual ac-
counts, the FAME database is biased towards large firms (Du, Gong and Temouri,
2015). However, Ribeiro et al. (2010) suggest that this bias is not now as strong as
it was, since more small firms have been included in the database over the last few
years. Although FAME has this disadvantage, several contributors to the literature
use this data, such as Greenaway, Kneller and Zhang (2007), Harris and Li (2008),
and Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007).12
After omitting firms that lacked the required data, we begin with a dataset
with over 110,000 firms, before the data cleaning procedure. We drop observations
with missing data for the variables of interest (output, capital, employment and
intermediate input) in order to restrict the sample to firms that have at least two
consecutive years of data available. Moreover, we also drop firms that are in the top
and bottom 1% of ratios for capital-labour and capital-output variables.13 After the
cleaning procedure our final dataset comprises an unbalanced panel, containing 9,752
firms with 54,609 observations for the 2003-2011 period.14 The dataset contains
information on firms from 15 different industries based on their 2-digit 2007 SIC
code. Almost 37% of these firms are observed in at least eight years throughout the
nine-year period, while most of the firms are observed for some part of 2003-2011.
11A full list of variable descriptions used in this study can be found in Table A1.1 in Appendix
1 Section A.
12Greenaway, Kneller and Zhang (2007) merge the FAME database with data from Onesource to
improve its representativeness.
13We applied this procedure in order to avoid the impact of outliers on our results, following
Eberhardt and Helmers (2010).
14The size of the data shrank dramatically after the data cleaning process. The main reason for
that is FAME keeps firms that exit the market in the database for 10 years by reporting missing
values for their annual accounts. Thus, such firms have to be discarded from our dataset.
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Gross output is defined as total turnover in FAME, and it is deflated by using
Producer Price Indices for output (2005 prices).15 Intermediate inputs (cost of sales
in FAME) are similarly deflated by using PPI (input) index numbers. And capital
(i.e. tangible assets in FAME) is deflated by using an index for fixed investment.
With regard to the information on exporting, the overseas turnover variable in FAME
is used. This variable is also deflated using PPI (output) figures as we do for the gross
output. The age of a firm is calculated using the information about the incorporation
year of the firm. Finally, by using the National Statistics Post-code Directory, we
convert the firm’s post-code information to regional location information, and we
obtained the Region variable.
Table 2.1 contains summary statistics for the variables used for the estimation
of the production function, such as output, capital, employment and material costs.
The statistics suggest a small increase in the average output during the nine years,
while the figures for the other variables have not changed that much on average for
the observed firms.
15All price indices are available from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) website. The code
for PPI index is MM22, and the index for fixed investments price is MM17.
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2.4.2. Some Descriptive Statistics
By utilizing the export variable to indicate whether a firm has any overseas
turnover, we split firms into two groups, exporters and non-exporters, and we com-
pare these two groups of firms based on a wide range of performance measures, such
as productivity, size, output, and capital. We use two different measures for firm-
level productivity: labour productivity (LP) and total factor productivity (TFP). We
report two different versions of TFP which are TFPOLS and TFPLevPet. TFPOLS is
obtained by employing an ordinary least squares method, while TFPLevPet is com-
puted via a semi-parametric estimation technique developed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003). The size of a firm is measured by the number of employees, while capital is
measured as the absolute value of capital stock.
Table 2.2 illustrates the number of active firms and the percentage of export
participation during the nine years period, together with the export intensity, which
is calculated as a ratio of overseas turnover to gross turnover. While the number
of active firms that we observed increased over the period examined, the export
participation rate remained stable for the period 2003-2011.
Table 2.3 presents the average values of some important variables that will be used
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in the following stages of this work. This table enables us to compare exporter and
non-exporter firms with respect to their size, capital stock, and output, in addition
to their productivity. Much research confirms the superior performance of exporter
firms compared to firms that operate only in the domestic market, and Table 2.3
provides our calculations for the UK manufacturing firms, which are closely aligned
with the results from the relevant literature.
2.4.3. Are Exporters More Productive Than Non-Exporters?
Before analysing the potential causal relationship between productivity and ex-
porting, this subsection first establishes evidence for a positive correlation. The
descriptive statistics that we report in the above section suggest the superior per-
formance of exporters, and this is consistent with the previous empirical results. In
order to provide additional support to this descriptive evidence, we will basically
regress several productivity measures on export status, which is a dummy variable,
taking the value of 1 for exporting firms and 0 for non-exporters. The starting point
of our empirical estimation approach is based on the procedure employed by Bernard
and Jensen (1999), which is used by most of the empirical work in this literature.
The regression takes the form:
ln(Prod) = b0 +  1Exportit + b2ln(Size)it + dt + ds + uit (2.5)
As dependent variable we use different productivity measures which are summa-
rized by ln(Prod). The variables are the natural log of labour productivity (LP)
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and total factor productivity: TFPOLS and TFPLevPet respectively. Export is rep-
resented by a dummy variable, which takes value 1 if a firm has any positive overseas
return and zero otherwise, and lnSize is the logarithm of the number of employees.
We also add dummy variables for each industry, and year. By adding these dum-
mies, we aimed to control for industry-specific characteristics and business cycles
respectively.16
The variable of interest is the export dummy, which indicates the average pre-
mium of exporting firms. Thus, we report the results for this coefficient. Table 2.4
provides results for the period 2003-2011, and illustrates that export performance is
positively related to all productivity measures, as we expected. The coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% level for all cases, and suggest that exporters are
around 11-12% more productive than non-exporters, for all productivity measures.17
16Firms in some sectors are bigger and more productive, on average, than firms in other sectors.
17We also can consider firm fixed effects in our estimation, and adjust equation (2.5) accordingly.
Please see Appendix 1 Section C for the fixed effects model, and the estimation results.
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2.5. Self-Selection to Export Markets
2.5.1. The Econometric Model
As we show above, exporters are more productive than non-exporters. In this
subsection, the causal relationship between the two will be analyzed. As discussed
before, productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters might be a
consequence of a self-selection mechanism. It is suggested by the relevant literature
that exporting firms face a sunk costs of entry to international markets where they
are exposed to higher competition. Thus, it is claimed that only better firms can
become exporters, in other words, the initial performance of a firm should be an
important factor in the export decision to export (Roberts and Tybout 1997; Melitz
2003).
In this section, we aim to assess the determinants of the decision to export by
focusing on the effects of sunk costs and some firm characteristics on the probability
of becoming an exporter. We will conduct our analysis by utilizing a binary choice
model, since our export participation variable is a binary variable (taking two possible
outcomes, 0 or 1).18 We will use the model below by following Roberts and Tybout
(1997). According to their model, firm i exports in period t if the expected gross
revenue of the firm exceeds the current cost. Thus, the condition of export decision
is:
Yit =
8>><>>:
1, if pitq⇤it   cit(Xt, Zit, q⇤it 1 | q⇤it) + S(1  Yit 1)
0, otherwise
where Yit and Yit 1 stand for the export status of firm i at time t, and t   1
respectively. S represents the sunk entry costs, pit is the price of goods sold abroad,
and cit is the variable cost of producing q⇤it. Xt and Zit indicate vectors of exogenous
18Models with binary dependent variables are usually tested by using linear probability, probit
or logit models.
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factors and firm-specific factors that affect the firm’s export decision. Based on the
equation above we will test self-selection hypothesis by using following the binary-
choice model:19
Yit =
8>><>>:
1 if b1Xt + b2Zit   S(1  Yit 1) + uit   0
0, otherwise
where we basically aim to identify and quantify the factors that affect the prob-
ability of being an exporter.
There are some methodological issues worth mentioning. The first is the pos-
sibility of unobserved factors that might affect the firm’s export decision, such as
managerial abilities or strategic management (Syverson, 2011). The unobservable
factors can be exogenous as well as firm-specific, or time-variant or time-invariant.
In the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects, one needs to control for them
carefully in order to be able to obtain consistent estimates.20
The second problem arises from including the lagged dependent variable in the
model. As we mentioned above, Roberts and Tybout (1997), Bernard and Jensen
(2004), and Melitz (2003) suggest that sunk entry cost plays a crucial role in a firm’s
export decision. Thus, we should consider the effect of sunk entry costs, which are
represented by the lagged export status, Yit 1, in our model. Yit 1 is equal to 1 if
firm i at time t   1 is an exporter. This suggests that firm i overcomes the sunk
cost at time t   1, and it will not incur any sunk cost of export, in case it chooses
to export again at time t. For that reason we consider the coefficient of Yit 1 as a
measure of sunk cost. The problem is that, both dependent variable Yit and lagged
dependent variable Yit 1, are a function of the error term, uit. Thus, including the
19We follow Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) at this stage.
20As Wooldridge (2003) describes, in the presence of unobserved fixed effects, the error term in
equation (2.7), uit, can be written as a composite error including both unobserved fixed effects, ei,
and idiosyncratic error, hit (as in equation 2.6). Researchers usually use random or fixed-effects
models to tackle this problem.
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lagged dependent variable in the model causes an endogeneity problem. Moreover, if
the lagged dependent variable is correlated to other explanatory variables, it might
lead to a multicollinearity.21
Finally, the possibility of the existence of a two-way relationship between firm
characteristics and export decisions may lead to a simultaneity problem. Most of the
studies in this literature use lagged explanatory variables to overcome this issue.22
In this study, we also utilize this approach in order to eliminate the simultaneity
problem. The equation we estimate takes the form:
Yit =b0 + b1Yit 1 + b2TFPit 1 + b3Zit 1 + dt + ds + dr + ei + hit (2.6)
where b1 and b2 are vectors of coefficients. Yit represents the export status of
firm i at time t, and the lagged dependent variable, Yit 1, is included in order to
control for the sunk entry cost. ei represents time-invariant firm-specific unobservable
characteristics and hit represents idiosyncratic error. Zit 1 is a vector of control
variables including firm-specific time-variant characteristics, which were lagged one
year. Sector dummy, ds, is included to capture industry-specific effects. Time-specific
factors that affect all firms, for instance macroeconomic shocks, are controlled by year
dummy, dt. Finally, in order to capture region-specific factors, we include region
dummy, dr.
We use four different specifications: (1) Linear Probability Model, (2) Pooled-
Probit, (3) Random Effects Probit, and (4) Dynamic Probit. First, we estimate
the following equation by utilizing a linear probability model, and a pooled-probit
model:23
21For instance, firm-level productivity might be correlated to lagged export status as a result of
a potential learning-by-exporting effect.
22The use of the simultaneous equation models is preferable in order to tackle the simultane-
ity problem. However, simultaneous equation models require many instrumental variables, which
makes this approach hard to employ in a panel data context (Hiep and Ohta, 2007).
23Since logit fails to control for the problem arising from the use of the lagged dependent variable,
we prefer to use probit models in this study.
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Yit =b0 + b1Yit 1 + b2TFPit 1 + b3Zit 1 + dt + ds + dr + uit (2.7)
One of the major limitations of the linear probability models is that they might
provide estimations for probability outside the unit interval [0,1], which is unrealistic.
Thus, the majority of the studies in this literature prefer logit or probit models
to assess the determinants of the firm’s export decision. We also are aware that
linear probability, and pooled-probit models, have a strong assumption that the
error term, uit, is normally distributed and uncorrelated to explanatory variables,
where uit = ei + hit.
24 This is not a very realistic approach in our case, and it might
cause biased and inconsistent estimates. However, we will report the results from
these specifications, since this will make us able to compare these findings to results
from the other specifications.
In specification (3), we a employ random-effects probit model which controls for
unobserved effects by assuming that the regressors are independent of the unob-
servables (Wooldridge, 2002).25 Finally, in specification (4), we utilize the dynamic
random effects probit model that tackles unobserved effects, as well as the endogene-
ity problem arising from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (Wooldridge,
2005).
As we discussed, pooled-probit and random effects probit models face two impor-
tant theoretical and practical problems: (i) treatment of individual effects, and (ii)
treatment of initial observations of export status. On the other hand, the dynamic
probit model proposed by Wooldridge (2005) allows for correlation between individ-
ual effect and exogenous regressors, and resolves the issue arising from the treatment
of individual effects. The dynamic structure of this model also allows us to consider
the path dependence of export status, namely the lagged dependent variable Yit 1.
24In other words, these models ignore any unobserved firm fixed effects.
25We then relax this assumption and employ a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation
by Arellano and Bond (1991) in Section 2.7 as a robustness check.
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Moreover, this approach includes the initial export status, Yi0, in the model as
well as the firm-specific time average of the covariates. By doing this, Wooldridge
(2005) deals with the initial condition problem, and shows that consistent estimates
can be obtained even if the initial condition matters.
For specification (4), we estimate the following dynamic panel probit regression:
Yit = b0+b1Yit 1 + b2lnTFPit 1 + b3Zit 1 + dt + ds + dr + "i (2.8)
where "i = a0 + a1Yi0 + a2lnTFPi + a3Zi + ⌘i
In equation (2.8) we again include one year lagged export status, Yit 1, to capture
the sunk entry cost effects. "i represents the firm-level unobserved fixed effects,
while lnTFPi, and Zi stand for time average of firm-level productivity, and time
average of the remaining control variables.26 Finally, Yi0 is the initial status of
export participation for firm i.
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable is the firm’s export status, and our
main interest is the relationship between firm-level productivity and the export deci-
sion. Following relevant literature, we include some other firm-specific and exogenous
characteristics which might affect a firm’s export decision in our analysis, such as
size, age of a firm, and wages. Size is used as a variable in the majority of empirical
studies in the relevant literature. It is believed that larger firms might benefit from
economies of scale, thus a positive relationship between export status and firm size
is expected. In this study, we use number of employees as the size variable. It is
believed in the literature that firms’ experience, in terms of years, is positively cor-
related to the decision to export, thus we include a variable for age into our analysis
in order to assess the experience effect. We calculate a firm’s age by reference to the
firm’s foundation year. A capitalintensity variable is included in order to control for
firm’s technology. Workforce quality is another important variable that might affect
26The remaining error term, hi, is iid over time and individuals.
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the firm’s export decision. This variable is usually represented by average wage or
the ratio of the number of skilled workers to total employees. Although the latter is
preferred, we use average wage as a proxy for labour skill, since our database does
not provide information about the structure of workforce of firms.
2.5.2. Results
2.5.2.1. Estimation Results From Pooled Data
Table 2.5a presents our findings from four different specifications: (1) Linear
Probability Model; (2) Pooled-Probit; (3) Random Effects Probit; and (4) Dynamic
Probit. We use pooled data from all industries and time periods, and all specifications
contain sector, region, and time dummy variables. Column (4) reports that firms that
exported at time t 1 are more likely to export at time t, since we observe a positive,
and highly significant coefficient for the lagged dependent variable (exportt 1). This
finding is in line with the results from Roberts and Tybout (1997); Bernard and
Jensen (2004); and Arnold and Hussinger (2005) (and many others) who highlight
the importance of sunk cost in self-selection analysis.
The estimation results for the first three specifications show that firm productivity
is an important determinant of the export decision for the UK manufacturing firms,
while the support for the self-selection hypothesis vanishes when we consider the sunk
cost effect. The effect of average wage is positive and significant for specifications (1)-
(3), implying that firms employing more skilled workers are more likely to export.
However, the evidence for a positive relationship between labour skill and export
disappears when we include sunk cost in our model. Our results for all specifications
suggest that firms with more experience in terms of years are more likely to export,
given that we find positive and significant coefficients for the age variable. Finally,
firm size, which is represented by the number of employees also seems an important
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determinant of firms’ export status, and the relationship is positive. This finding
too is consistent with the literature.
Table 2.5b reports the marginal effects of the right hand side variables on the
probability of export, and these findings are comparable with the coefficients from
the LPM estimation in Table 2.5a. As can be seen in Table 2.5b column (4), a dis-
crete change from 0 to 1 in lagged export status increases the export probability at
time t by 39%. This suggests that firms that exported in the previous year are 39%
more likely to export in the following year compared to firms that did not export
in the previous year. Moreover, specifications (1), (2), and (3) show that firm-level
productivity has a positive and significant effect on firms’ export decisions, but not
a very big one. A 1% increase in a firm’s total factor productivity at time t   1
increases the export probability at time t by 2%. However, the size of the marginal
effect of firm productivity is around eight times smaller compared to other specifi-
cations (.035%). This difference, we believe, arises from the inclusion of the sunk
cost effect in specification (4). Since the sunk cost is not considered in specifications
(1)-(3), TFP effect is overestimated.
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‌Result 1: The well-established self-selection hypothesis is confirmed for the UK
manufacturing firms, when we ignore the potential effect of sunk cost of exporting
(specifications 1-3). However, when we consider the sunk cost of export, the support
for the self-selection hypothesis vanishes.
2.5.2.2. Estimation Results From Industry-Level Data
Almost all empirical studies in the literature on firm level productivity and export
decisions examine the self-selection hypothesis by using pooled data, where all firms
from different industries are considered together (as we do in the previous subsec-
tion). However, as we show in section 2.6, each industry has different characteristics:
firms in some industries operate with rising marginal costs, while in some industries
they produce at a constant marginal cost. In order to account for such differences,
we test the self-selection hypothesis again, but this time for each industry. Our es-
timates in the previous subsection show that the export decision at time t  1 is an
important determinant of the export decision of a firm at year t, which suggests that
the sunk cost of entering the export market is an important factor for our analysis.
Thus, amongst all four specifications, we decided to use Wooldridge’s dynamic probit
model for the current analysis, since, as we explained, it is the only one that is able
to take the lagged dependent variable (which represents the sunk cost of export) in
to account.
First, Table A1.3 in Appendix I Section A shows that the sunk cost effect is
positive, and significant for all industries, and the highest effect is observed in the
Non-metal Minerals Industry with around 48%. This suggests that being an exporter
at time t 1, increases the probability of exporting at time t by around 48%, compared
to a firm that does not export at t  1. We also find that this effect is the smallest,
at 9%, in Other Transport Industry, which might imply a low sunk cost of export
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for this industry.
Second, we show that, our findings for the self-selection hypothesis are mixed.
We confirm it for some industries, such as Textile/Cloth/Leather, and Other Man-
ufacturing. In other words, we find that more productive firms in these industries
at time t  1, are more likely to enter the export market at year t. The probability
of export of a firm in Textile/Cloth/Leather industry increases by around 2.5%, if
its productivity increases by 1%, while the probability of export increases by around
8.5% for firms operating in Other Manufacturing industry. These findings are consis-
tent with Melitz’s results, suggesting that more productive firms self-select to enter
the export market.
On the other hand, we observe a negative and significant relationship between
TFP and the export decision for some industries, such as Non-metal Minerals and
Motor vehicles/parts. This finding is very interesting because it suggests that, in
these industries, less productive firms self-select to export, which is the opposite of
Melitz’s findings.
Finally, we find a positive but not significant relationship between TFP and
export decisions for some industries, such as Wood Products and Paper/Printing,
while for some other industries, such as Electric Machinery and Coke/Chemicals,
this relationship is both negative and insignificant.
Result 2: We observe findings that are opposite to those proposed by the self-
selection hypothesis. Namely, we find that in some industries in the UK, such as Non-
metal Minerals and Motor Vehicles/Parts, less productive firms are more likely to
export, and these results are robust across different dynamic estimation specifications.
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2.6. Testing the Marginal Cost Assumption
In this section we examine the relationship between export and domestic sales
for the UK manufacturing firms. We aim to show whether the independent markets
assumption of Melitz (2003) holds for the UK firms. Initially, we group firms in our
dataset in terms of their export switching status. We classify a firm as a starter,
stopper, or a continuer, where a starter firm is a firm that begins exporting in a given
year, and a firm that stops exporting in a given year is classified as a stopper. All
other firms (continuing exporters and non-exporters) are considered as continuers.
We aim to explore, whether a firm entering the export market reduces its domes-
tic sales compared to export stoppers and continuers, by estimating the following
equation:
Dln(DomesticSales)irt = b0 + b1starterirt + b2stopperirt +Xi
+b3Dln(TFP ) + dt + ds + dr + uirt
(2.9)
In equation (2.9),Dln(DomesticSales)irt stands for domestic sales growth. starterirt =
1 if firm i in industry r enters the export market in period t, while stopperirt = 1
for firms that stop exporting. Furthermore, dt , ds, and dr are time, 2-digit SIC
sector, and region dummy variables respectively, while Xi stands for firm fixed ef-
fects.27 Finally, Dln(TFP ) represents total factor productivity growth of a firm. The
coefficient b1 measures mean variation in domestic sales growth for export starters
compared to export stoppers and continuers.
Table 2.6 shows that, relative to continuers and stoppers, starters have a lower
domestic sales growth rate, and stoppers have the highest domestic sales growth rate
amongst the three categories. These results suggest that firms that begin exporting
might face a trade-off between the export market and domestic market in terms of
sales, and consequently reduce their domestic sales.
27Here, Xi controls for firm-specific differences between starters, stoppers and continuers.
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The findings we discussed so far provide us with useful information about the
firms’ domestic growth rates, but they do not give a clear result regarding the re-
lationship between export and domestic sales. In order to test this relationship we
use a panel of solely containing continuing exporters, which only includes firms that
report positive exports for all observations. We estimate the following equation:
Dln(ExportSales)irt = b0 + b1Dln(DomesticSales)irt
+b2Xirt +Xi + dt + ds + dr + uirt
(2.10)
where Dln(ExportSales)irt and Dln(DomesticSales)irt represent the growth fig-
ures for foreign and domestic sales respectively. Again, dt , ds, and dr are time,
2-digit SIC sector, and region dummy variables. b1 shows the correlation between
the growth rate of domestic sales and export sales, while Xirt contains some firm-
specific, time varying, characteristics, such as the growth rate of tangible assets, and
the growth rate of number of employees.28 Firm-level productivity growth is another
factor that potentially has an effect on both domestic and foreign sales of a firm.
28The growth rates of tangible assets are used in all specifications, while the growth rate of
employment is considered in specifications 2 and 4.
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Thus, we include it in our analysis in all specifications. Xi represents firm-specific
characteristics, which are constant over time. We use Pooled OLS in specifications 1
and 2, while a fixed effect estimation of equation (2.10) is reported in specifications
3 and 4.29
Table 2.7 shows that b1 is negative for all specifications, and significant in spec-
ifications 2 and 4. In other words, both Pooled OLS, and fixed effect estimations
suggest that the growth rate of sales in the domestic and export markets for contin-
uing exporters are negatively correlated, which contradict the independent markets
assumption of both standard and new trade models.
We also conduct the same analysis for each industry by estimating equation (2.10)
based on 2-digit UK SIC codes. Tables A1.5 and A1.6 (in Appendix 1 Section A)
provide results for OLS and FE estimations at industry level. All specifications
in Tables A1.5 and A1.6 show that for some industries, such as Coke/Chemicals,
29As an alternative to Pooled OLS, a fixed effect estimation performs better when it comes to
examining within-firm variations.
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Basic/Fabricated Metals, Machinery/Equipment, Motor Vehicles/Parts, and Other
Transport, b1 is negative and significant. So, the growth rates of sales in the domes-
tic and export markets are negatively correlated, and this raises doubts about the
constant marginal costs assumption of both standard and new trade models.
The observed negative relationship between domestic, and foreign sales for the
UK manufacturing firms could be explained via the correlation between domestic,
and foreign demand shocks. In other words, if there is a negative correlation between
the demand shocks, then it may result in a negative relationship between domestic,
and foreign sales even though the firm produces at a constant marginal cost. How-
ever, for the UK firms, a negative correlation between domestic and foreign demand
shocks seem implausible, given that the UK manufacturing firms have close trade
relationships with European countries (BIS, 2010). Hence, we believe this is best
explained by the existence of increasing marginal costs. To summarize we state:
Result 3: We show that in several important UK manufacturing sectors, such as
Paper/Printing, Coke/Chemicals, and Basic/Fabricated Metals, firms produce with
rising marginal costs.
2.7. Robustness Check
We now perform a robustness check for the Result 2, which we obtained by using
the dynamic random effects probit model. As we already mentioned, a random-effects
probit model assumes that the regressors are independent of the unobservables. More
precisely, it is assumed that firm fixed effects, such as management and skills, are not
correlated with explanatory variables, for instance firm-level productivity, and firm
size in our model. If these firm-specific managerial skills or strategic management are
correlated with regressors, then the problem of endogeneity occurs. In such a case,
the random-effects probit model will provide biased results, since its key assumption
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is violated.
Some studies in the literature, such as Bernard and Jensen (2004), utilize a linear
probability model with fixed effects in order to tackle unobserved firm heterogeneity.
However, as we already explained, this model has important limitations. Instead of
a linear probability model with fixed effects, Bernard and Jensen (2004) also use a
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991). In this study, we also employ a GMM in order to control for unobserved
firm heterogeneity, which may arise from firm fixed effects. Table A1.4 in Appendix
1 Section A shows results from the GMM estimation of equation (2.8). The results
for the lagged dependent variable are very similar to those from the dynamic pro-
bit model. The coefficients representing the sunk cost of export are positive and
significant for all industries. Our findings for the effect of firm productivity on the
probability of entering the export market are also very similar to those we obtained
by using dynamic probit model. The only difference is that we obtain a negative
and insignificant coefficient for the Non-Metal Minerals industry, while we obtain a
negative and significant one from the dynamic probit model estimations.
To conclude, we obtain very similar results from two different dynamic specifica-
tions. The dynamic random effects probit deals with the unobserved heterogeneity
through the independence assumption, while GMM solves the same issue explicitly.
Although the key assumptions of these models are very different, the results they
produce are very similar. This suggests that the dynamic random effects probit spec-
ification that we use in the previous subsection does not suffer from an unobserved
heterogeneity effect.
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2.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have revisited the predictions of Melitz (2003) who suggests
that more productive firms self-select to enter the export market. Initially, we used a
dataset where all industries are pooled, and showed that more productive UK firms
do self-select for the foreign market, if we do not consider the sunk cost of export, as
many of the UK based studies do. However, we also showed that, when we consider
the sunk cost of export, which is represented by the previous year’s export status in
the model, our findings do not confirm the self-selection hypothesis.
Then, we ran the same analysis for each industry, showing that self-selection
occurs in some industries, Textiles/Cloth/Leather and Other Manufacturing, while
we found that less productive firms self-select to enter the export market in some
other industries, such as Non-Metal Minerals, and Motor Vehicles/Parts.
Following this, we showed that this evidence against self-selection can be best
explained by the existence of increasing, rather than constant, marginal costs. We
find that the average levels of sales growth in domestic and foreign markets are
negatively correlated in many UK manufacturing industries, and to the best of our
knowledge this is the first study examining this for the UK industries. This negative
correlation suggests that optimal output levels in each individual market are not
independent of the other markets for firms in some industries, and this raises doubts
about the constant marginal costs assumption of both the standard and new trade
models. Finally we showed that self-selection does not occur in some UK industries
where firms produce at increasing marginal cost, such as Non-Metal Minerals, and
Motor Vehicles/Parts.
The most serious limitation of this study arises from the data we use. As we
highlight in section 4, the FAME dataset is widely utilized in many UK studies, but
it is not exempt from criticism. The use of this dataset is criticized by Harris and Li
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(2008), who claim that the dataset is biased towards large enterprises, and is therefore
unrepresentative of UK firms. On the other hand, Rizov and Walsh (2005) describe
the data as one of the most comprehensive databases of UK firms. Eberhardt and
Helmers (2010) also address the representativity issue of FAME, and report some
other potential problems, such as the lack of investment information in the dataset.
Ideally, we would prefer to use a dataset provided by an official statistical institute
of a country: however, such data is not very easy to access. As a further research
agenda, we are planning to test the predictions of this analysis by using Turkish
firm-level data, which will be provided by Turkish Statistical Institute. We believe
that it will be interesting to compare our results from this study to findings from an
analysis of Turkish firms, providing a good example of an emerging economy.
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Appendix 1 - Section A:
Table A1.1: Variable Description 
Variables Definitions  
Exporter Dummy variable coded 1 if firm has positive overseas turnover in any year (2003-2011) 
Gross Output Turnover (in £'000, 2005 prices) 
TFP Total factor productivity 
Employment Number of employees in the firm 
Labour Productivity Gross output per employee 
Capital stock Tangible assets (in £'000, 2005 prices) 
Intermediate Inputs Cost of sales minus remuneration (in £'000, 2005 prices) 
Intangible Assets Non-monetary assets (e.g. innovation, brand, etc.) 
Wage Total labour payment/Number of Employee 
Age Number of years in business 
Industry 1 coded 1 if Basic/Fabricated  Metals, 0 otherwise 
Industry 2 coded 1 if Coke/Chemicals, 0 otherwise 
Industry 3 coded 1 if Electrical machinery, 0 otherwise 
Industry 4 coded 1 if Food/Beverages/Tobacco, 0 otherwise 
Industry 5 coded 1 if Machinery/Equipment, 0 otherwise 
Industry 6 coded 1 if Motor vehicles/parts, 0 otherwise 
Industry 7 coded 1 if Non-metal Minerals, 0 otherwise 
Industry 8 coded 1 if Office Equipment, 0 otherwise 
Industry 9 coded 1 if Other manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
Industry 10 coded 1 if Other transport, 0 otherwise 
Industry 11 coded 1 if Paper/Printing, 0 otherwise 
Industry 12 coded 1 if Rubber/Plastic, 0 otherwise 
Industry 13 coded 1 if Textiles/Cloth/Leather, 0 otherwise 
Industry 14 coded 1 if Wood Products, 0 otherwise 
Region 1 coded 1 if East England, 0 otherwise 
Region 2 coded 1 if East Midlands, 0 otherwise 
Region 3 coded 1 if London, 0 otherwise 
Region 4 coded 1 if North East, 0 otherwise 
Region 5 coded 1 if North West, 0 otherwise 
Region 6 coded 1 if South East, 0 otherwise 
Region 7 coded 1 if South West, 0 otherwise 
Region 8 coded 1 if Wales, 0 otherwise 
Region 9 coded 1 if West Midlands, 0 otherwise 
Region 10 coded 1 if Yorkshire&Humberside, 0 otherwise 
Region 11 coded 1 if Scotland, 0 otherwise 
Region 12 coded 1 if Northen Ireland, 0 otherwise 
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Table A1.2: Marginal Cost and Self-Selection Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Rising MC  
 
Self-Selection 
to Export 
Food/Beverages/Tobacco insignificant 
 
insignificant 
    Textiles/Cloth/Leather      X 
 
9  
    Wood Products insignificant 
 
insignificant 
    Paper/Printing insignificant 
 
insignificant 
    Coke/Chemicals 9  
 
insignificant 
    Rubber/Plastic 9  
 
insignificant 
    Non-metal Minerals 9  
 
               X 
    Basic/Fabricated  Metals 9  
 
insignificant 
    Machinery/Equipment 9  
 
insignificant 
    Office Equipment 9  
 
insignificant 
    Electrical machinery insignificant 
 
insignificant 
    
Motor vehicles/parts 9  
 
                X 
    Other transport 9  
 
insignificant 
    Other manufacturing      X 
 
9  
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Appendix 1 - Section B:
Methodological Issues and TFP Estimation Methods
Some Methodological Issues
In this subsection, some methodological issues arising from the estimation of TFP
will be explained and different estimation methods aiming to tackle these issues will
be analyzed. One can estimate equation (2.4) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
However, the use of the standard OLS procedure to estimate firm-level TFP provides
biased estimates because of endogeneity of input choices (i.e. simultaneity bias) and
selection bias (van Beveren, 2012).
As Marschak and Andrews (1944) highlight, characteristics of a firm play an
important role in determining production function inputs. In other words, “simul-
taneity bias” arises from a correlation between unobserved productivity shocks and
input choice. Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest that if a firm has prior knowledge
of wit before making an input choice, this causes endogeneity, since input decisions
will be affected by the prior knowledge.30 Although Marschak and Andrews (1944)
highlighted the importance of this issue for the estimation of TFP a long time ago,
only very recently some new methods have been developed to deal with this prob-
lem.31 Some newly developed techniques amongst them, such as Olley and Pakes
(1996), Blundell and Bond (2000), and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) have replaced
the traditional methods over the last fifteen years.
Another issue in the estimation of TFP is a “selection problem” arising from
the market entry and exit of firms in any period. Earlier studies in the literature
30As De Loecker (2007) describes, a positive productivity shock causes upward bias in input
coefficients, since firms tend to increase the use of input quantities under a positive productivity
shock.
31Until recently, this problem has been addressed by using some traditional methods, such as
fixed effects and instrumental variables.
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used balanced panels which avoids the market entry and exit behaviours of firms.
However, by using a panel for Spanish manufacturing firms, Farinas and Ruano
(2005) show that a firm’s exit is a function of unobserved productivity. Moreover,
they suggested that more productive firms had a lower probability of exit from the
market. And if firms have prior knowledge about their productivity levels (wit), then
their decisions on input allocation will depend on its survival probability.32 Thus, if
the selection bias is not taken into account explicitly, it causes TFP estimation to
be biased upwards (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010).
The final methodological issue we will discuss is “omitted price bias”, which is
associated with the use of industry level price indices in order to deflate input and
output variables. In such a case, if firms’ decision on input choice depends on firm-
level price differences, this would result in biased estimates. Since firm-level prices are
rarely available, this problem is common for most of empirical studies conducting
firm-level analysis.33 Recently, some studies tried to overcome this problem, such
as De Loecker (2007), who introduces differentiated factor markets and demand
conditions for exporters and non-exporters to Olley and Pakes’s (1996) estimation
procedure.
TFP Estimation Methods
In recent years there has been considerable progress on the measurement of total
factor productivity, and there are different methods available for researchers. In this
part of the study, we will review some of the methods that were developed in order
to tackle problems of simultaneity and sample selection biases.
32Selection bias will lead to a negative correlation between eit and Kit. This causes downward
bias for the capital coefficient (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010).
33However, this problem can be tackled by using quantities of output rather than deflated sales,
where available (van Beveren, 2012).
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Fixed Effects Estimator
As we have already discussed, estimation of the production function using OLS
provides inconsistent and biased estimates. However, the fixed effects estimator
aims to overcome simultaneity bias problem by assuming wit is plant-specific and
time-invariant, wi (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Under this assumption, a fixed
effects estimator would provide results unaffected by both simultaneity and selection
biases. However, Olley and Pakes (1996) show that applying a fixed effects estimator
both on balanced and unbalanced panels provides different results. In other words,
their results show that this estimator is not successful in eliminating of selection
bias caused by endogenous entry and exit. Moreover, Wooldridge (2009) states
that the assumption of the fixed effects estimator, which is associated with the
strict exogeneity of the outputs, is unreal. He shows that the fixed effects estimator
performs inefficiently if this assumption fails.34
Standard Instrumental Variables (IV) Regression
These disadvantages of the OLS and the fixed effects approach have led researchers
to the instrumental variable method which is another way to tackle simultaneity
problem (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003).35 This approach uses instruments for the
input variables in the production function which cause the problem of endogeneity.36
Input prices are commonly used as instruments in this literature, although they serve
their purpose well only if input markets operate in perfect competition, which is rare
(van Beveren, 2012).37
34This assumption implies that the firm’s input decision is independent of a productivity shock.
35As Wooldridge (2009) states, unlike fixed-effects estimator, the instrumental variables (IV)
approach does not require strict exogeneity of the independent variables, which makes this method
preferable to the fixed-effects estimator.
36Instruments, in our case, are the variables that are correlated with the inputs in the production
function but uncorrelated with unobserved productivity.
37If some firms have market power they are likely to affect input prices. This might cause a
correlation between unobserved productivity and instruments. In such a case, input prices lose
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Other instruments that are commonly used in the literature are the lagged levels
of the inputs. However, as Blundell and Bond (2000) highlight, this approach also
has some drawbacks.38 According to them the lagged levels of the inputs are usu-
ally highly persistent, thus they might be weakly correlated with input changes, and
therefore they may not be good instruments. In addition, one should be aware that
even if the selected instruments are valid, this method can only overcome the simul-
taneity problem. The problem of selection bias arising from the firms’ endogenous
exits from the market cannot be controlled by using this approach.39
Olley-Pakes (OP) and Levinsohn-Petrin (LEV) Estimation Algorithms
As discussed above, finding a valid instrument is not an easy task. Recently,
some researchers have tried to develop methods that do not require instruments to
estimate the production function. Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP) is the first
study following this approach to tackle both problems of simultaneity and selection.
OP developed a semi-parametric estimator by using a firm’s investment decision to
control for correlation between inputs in the production function and an unobserved
productivity shock. They also take the firm’s exit decision into account explicitly in
order to overcome selection bias.
The OP method has several advantages over the methods we have reviewed so
far, and it is widely used by researchers who conduct analysis related to firm-level
productivity.40 However, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LevPet) show
that the OP approach might not always work well, and they have developed an
their validity as an instrument.
38Blundell and Bond (2000) also provide a dynamic panel approach, an extended GMM esti-
mator. Since they believe that the weak instruments are the reason for the bad performance of
IV estimators, they use lagged first differences of production function variables and obtain better
results.
39Moreover, if there is a correlation between firm exit and the selected instruments, the instru-
ments would lose their validity (Ackerberg et al., 2007).
40Griliches and Mairesse report the advantages of this method over OLS, fixed effects, and tra-
ditional instrumental variables estimators (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995, p. 17)
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improved version of it. They highlight some technical issues with the OP approach
arising from the use of investment as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks,
and they propose to use intermediate input demand instead. According to LevPet,
the main disadvantage of the OP method arises from the monotonicity condition,
which only permits the use of observations that report positive investment. And
this requirement causes significant data loss. LevPet claim that they overcome this
issue by using intermediate input demand as a proxy instead of the firm’s investment
decision, since firms usually report positive use of intermediate input in each year.
These two methods deal with selection bias in different ways. Unlike the OP
method, the LevPet technique does not take the firm’s exit into account, since they
claim that such an approach does not improve their results a lot. Apart from omitting
the firm’s exit decision and using intermediate input demand as a proxy instead, these
two methods are fully analogous (van Beveren, 2012).
Appendix 1 - Section C:
Different Estimation Techniques
Now we will consider firm fixed effects in our estimations, by using the panel
structure of our data. Given the result of the Hausman test, we include firm fixed
effects in equation (6), in order to control for potential unobserved firm heterogeneity
explicitly. The model takes the form:41
ln(Prod) = b0 +  1Exportit + b2ln(Size)it + Zi + dt + ds + uit
where Zi is firm fixed effects. Table A1.7 provides our results for the fixed effects
model which shows that export status coefficient is still positive and statically signif-
icant at 1% level, however, the magnitude of estimated coefficients becomes smaller.
41We also used random effects estimator. However, the result of Hausman test suggests that
fixed effects model is preferable over the random effects model.
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Export productivity premium for total factor productivity measures are around 3%,
while it decreases to 1.6% for labour productivity.
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CH 3: Do Firms Learn From Exporting if Returns to
Scale are Variable?
3.1. Introduction
The relationship between export and growth, especially export-led growth, is well-
established at the macro-level (Edwards, 1993). However, at the micro-level, the lit-
erature on the links between exports and firm-level productivity is new and growing.
In theory, firms operating in international markets could benefit from exporting as
a result of technological exchange with their international rivals and clients. More-
over, exporters face pressure to improve their production techniques in order to meet
high requirements arising from intense competition in the international markets, and
this process, may cause productivity improvements (Aw, Chung and Roberts, 2000).
On top of that, exporters could benefit from the economies of scale which result
from the production capacity improvements determined by international demand.
Following an increasing availability of firm-level data, since the mid-1990s, several
studies have examined the productivity-enhancing effect of export at the firm level.
Although there are a number of studies on this issue, the evidence on the learning
by exporting (LBE) effect is mixed and still unclear (Wagner, 2007).
The literature on learning by exporting (LBE) focuses on three potential sources
of learning: technology transfer, competition, and economies of scale. Although the
literature suggests that economies of scale may play an important role in produc-
tivity, many empirical UK studies examining the relationship between export and
productivity ignore scale effects.42 It is rather surprising that some of these studies
assume constant returns to scale (CRTS) when it comes to total factor productivity
42We include those studies in the review of literature in Section 3.2
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(TFP) computation. In these studies, the effect of scale is overlooked as a result of
the assumption of CRTS. More precisely, TFP growth is assumed to be equivalent
to technical change only, since scale effects are assumed to be zero.43 However, if
returns to scale were not constant, productivity improvements from exporting could
be due not only to technical change, but may also reflect scale efficiency change
(Biesebroeck, 2005). For this reason, those studies employing conventional TFP es-
timation methods, such as the index method, or assuming a restrictive functional
form of a production function, such as Cobb-Douglas, are likely to provide biased
results for the export-productivity link.
This chapter has two main contributions. First, showing that some firms in the
UK experience non-constant returns to scale, we construct a TFP measure that ac-
counts for scale effect.44 To do this, we compute firm-level TFP by employing a
translog production function which allows for variable returns to scale (VRTS).45
Second, we show the effect of exporting on the three components of TFP: technical
change, scale change, and technological progress (efficiency) change. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first UK study to provide a decomposition of the causal effects of
exporting on firm-level productivity improvement. This analysis allows us to exam-
ine the different channels through which exporting influences TFP growth, namely
technical change, scale change, and efficiency change.
We conduct our analysis by using an unbalanced panel of UK manufacturing
firms covering the period 2003-11.46 In the first part of our analysis, we calculate
returns to scale for each firm, and show that some of the UK firms experience variable
returns to scale in a way that contradicts any assumption of CRTS.47
43Please see Coelli (2005) for a detailed discussion on this.
44Biesebroeck (2005) suggests that new exporters enjoy scale economies as they expand. Thus,
one should control for variable returns to scale to estimate TFP correctly.
45As De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) show, a translog production function perform better than
a Cobb-Douglas when it comes to TFP estimation.
46In this chapter, we use the dataset that we utilized in Chapter 2.
47Our findings are consistent with recent UK studies such as Girma and Gorg (2007) and Harris
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Following this, we estimate firm-level TFP by controlling for VRTS, and decom-
pose TFP growth into three components by utilizing Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA). Then we examine the post-entry effects of export on TFP growth, and its
components by comparing export starters (treatment group) with never-exporters
(control group). However, we cannot observe what would have happened to a firm
if it had not entered the export market. In other words, we can observe a firm in
only one situation, since it is either an exporter or a non-exporter in the observation
year. For this reason the results from a basic comparison between export starters
and never-exporters in terms of LBE effect may suffer from a selection bias. In this
paper we try to overcome this problem by employing a combined propensity score
matching and difference-in-differences methodology (PSM-DID). This approach al-
lows us to construct a control group from never-exporters where the distribution of
the observed covariates for both groups are very similar.
We observe some interesting patterns from our results. First, we find evidence in
favour of an LBE effect when we consider the TFP measure which we obtain from a
Cobb-Douglas production function. However, the evidence of LBE largely disappears
when we consider the TFP measure which accounts for scale effects. Second, and
more importantly, we show that any productivity growth effects of exporting are pre-
dominantly attributable to change in scale efficiency. More precisely, the main source
of TFP growth is not technical improvements, but scale efficiency improvements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review
of the related research, while section 3.3 explains the methodology used for the
estimation of total factor productivity (TFP) and provides some estimation results
for the production function. Section 3.4 describes the framework of the econometric
analysis that we employ in order to assess the relationship between export activity
and Li (2008), who find increasing returns to scale for some industries. On the other hand, Saal et
al. (2007) report decreasing returns to scale for the water and sewerage industry.
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and firm productivity. Finally, Section 3.5 provides results, and Section 3.6 offers
some concluding remarks.
3.2. Literature Review
We have already highlighted that economies of scale may play a crucial role in LBE
analysis, if firms produce with VRTS. This implies that the choice of an estimation
methodology for TFP matters when it comes to LBE analysis. The literature on
productivity analysis provides several methods that account for scale effects, from
non-parametric to fully parametric methods.48 However, some UK studies, such as
Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2007), use an estimation method for TFP which overlooks
scale effects. They calculate TFP, under the CRTS assumption, by using a non-
parametric approach (index number) proposed by Caves, Christiensen, and Diewert
(1982). Some other studies, such as Kneller and Pisu (2010), and Silvente (2005)
use a proxy for TFP that cannot take scale effects in to account. While Kneller and
Pisu (2010) use R&D level as proxy for TFP, Silvente (2005) use labour productivity.
Since such studies do not use TFP as a measure of productivity, their results are not
comparable to ours.49
Several other studies examine LBE effect for the UK firms. Girma, Greenaway,
and Kneller (2004), for instance, examine exporting and firm performance, for the
first time, for the UK manufacturing firms, and they report evidence in favour of
the LBE hypothesis. In their paper, they calculate TFP as residuals from a Cobb-
Douglas production function, where they report firm-level TFP relative to the in-
dustry average. Like Girma et al. (2004), Greenaway and Yu (2004) find evidence
for LBE. However, they conduct an industry specific analysis for the UK chemical
industry, where they also compute firm-level TFP as residuals from Cobb-Douglas
48See Heshmati (2003) for a survey.
49Thus, these studies are excluded from the review.
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production function estimations by assuming CRTS, and they report that the LBE
effect is bigger for new export starters compared to more experienced exporters. Un-
like our analysis, both Girma et al. (2004), Greenaway and Yu (2004) ignore any
scale effects which may arise from VRTS.
As we highlight in Section 3.4.1, selection bias is an important issue for LBE
analysis. Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2003) employ a matching with difference
in differences (DID) method in order to reduce selection bias, and this is the first
UK study to combine these techniques. They investigate the effect of export market
exit on TFP, and they find a negative relationship between the two, while the other
studies examine export market entry effect. Based on these results, they conclude
that an LBE effect exists. Following this study, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) use
a matching method, and they also find evidence of LBE from non-matched data.50
However, this finding disappears when they consider matched data. Hence, when
they control for selection bias, they fail to confirm any learning by exporting effect.
It is important to note that Greenaway and Kneller (2004) calculate TFP, under the
CRTS assumption, by using the index number approach. Unlike our study, both
Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2003) and Greenaway and Kneller (2004) overlook
VRTS when it comes to TFP computation.
The only UK study reporting variable returns to scale for UK firms in this lit-
erature is Harris and Li (2008), which employs a Cobb-Douglas production function
to compute firm-level TFP. Unlike Greenaway and Yu (2004), they do not impose
any constraint on the production function in terms of returns to scale.51 They es-
timate a Cobb-Douglas production function by using the generalized methods of
50Similar to Greenaway and Kneller (2004), Greenaway and Kneller (2008) also use a matching
with difference and differences method, where they construct firm-level TFP from a Cobb-Douglas
production function. However, they examine the post-entry effect of export by focusing on export
market exposure of firms, and report findings in favour of LBE for firms more exposed to the export
market only.
51They use an augmented production function with three inputs: capital, employment, and
intermediate inputs, and they allow variable returns to scale.
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moments (GMM) approach proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which corrects
for the simultaneity of input choices. They confirm the LBE hypothesis for the UK
manufacturing and service firms, and report that LBE effect is higher for continuing
exporters compared to new exporters.52 Although Harris and Li (2008) explicitly ac-
count for scale effects, they estimate TFP by employing a Cobb-Douglas production
function, which has certain limitations.53 Unlike our study, they report an exporting
effect only on TFP growth, and do not examine any effects on the components of
TFP change.
It is clear that results on LBE from the UK studies are mixed. As we report,
some studies compute TFP by using a non-parametric method, while some others
use regressions by employing a Cobb-Douglas production function. Moreover, some
studies compare all export-starters to all non-exporters to find an LBE effect, while
some others employ a matching method, and construct a new dataset that includes
only those export-starters and non-exporters that have similar characteristics. One
may say that different methodologies used to evaluate the LBE effect might be the
reason for the mixed results provided by the literature. We also aim to address this
issue in the remaining part of this study.
3.3. Decomposing Productivity Growth and Measur-
ing Returns to Scale
In this section, we aim to obtain estimates of firm level total factor productivity
by considering potential scale effects, and to decompose TFP growth in order to
show the effect of exporting on each component of productivity. In this study, we
52We described econometric problems arising from the simultaneity of input choices in Chapter
2.
53We highlight these issues in Section 3.3.
57
employ stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which is a widely-used method in several
areas as a way to measure performance.54 A production frontier relates to the maxi-
mum achievable output level for a firm by using existing production technology and
inputs. There are other methods available which can be used in order to decom-
pose TFP, such as data envelopment analysis, or the Malmquist index. However, as
Coelli (2005) highlights, SFA offers several advantages with regard to dealing with
measurement errors, outliers in data, and random shocks.
We obtain firm-level total factor productivity by using a firm-level transcenden-
tal logarithmic (translog) production function, which is a second-order logarithmic
approximation of the production that allows for variable returns to scale.55 We fol-
low Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) at this stage, and estimate the following translog
production function:
ln(Yit) =  0 +  1lnKit +  2lnLit +  3t+
1
2
 
 4(lnKit)2 +  5(lnLit)2 +  6t2
 
+ 7(lnKit ⇤ lnLit) +  8(lnKit ⇤ t) +  9(lnLit ⇤ t) + vit + uit
(3.1)
where Yit stands for output, Kit and Lit represent the input factors, respectively
capital and labour. Finally, t is time trend, and vit is a random error term. Table
A2.1 reports point estimates of production function.
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), and Sharma et al. (2007) suggest that estimated
total factor productivity growth can be decomposed into three components by uti-
lizing equation (3.1): technological process change, technical efficiency, and scale
efficiency.
• Technological process change (TP) represents technological improvements that
cause an upward shift in production frontier and it is calculated as:
54SFA is developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977).
55Note that the translog production function is a generalized version of a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function.
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 (TP )it =
@ln(Yit)
@t =  3 +  6t+  8lnKit +  9lnLit
We highlighted that, under the CRTS assumption, scale effects are overlooked
and assumed to be equal to zero. However, if returns to scale were not constant,
scale change could affect TFP growth. For this reason, we aim to examine whether
all UK firms produce with constant returns to scale, as assumed by some of the UK
studies. From equation (3.1) returns to scale for each firm can be calculated as:
"l = (@ln(Yit))/(@ln(Lit)) =  2 +  5lnLit +  7lnKit +  9t
"k = (@ln(Yit))/(@ln(Kit)) =  1 +  4lnKit +  7lnLit +  8t
where "k, and "l are output elasticities. Returns to scale (RTS) can then be
calculated as:
RTS = " = "l + "k
• Scale efficiency (SE) is related to the scale at which a firm achieves maximum
efficiency. As can be seen easily from equation (3.2) below, if there are constant
returns to scale, i.e. " = 1, then scale effects disappear and TFP growth is due
to technical change only, when scale effects equal to zero. However, if returns
to scale are variable, then scale effects become an important component of TFP
growth. Scale efficiency chance can be formulated as:
D(SE)it = ("  1)[( "k" )K˙ + ( "l" )L˙] (3.2)
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where K˙ and L˙ stand for changes in capital and labour with respect to time.
Table 3.1 above shows that many UK firms produce with variable returns to
scale. For this reason, we believe that scale effects should be taken into account for
UK firms in this analysis.56
• Technical efficiency (TE) shows whether a firm utilizes its technology in such
a way as to produce an optimum level of output.57 The change in technical
efficiency is calculated as:
D(TE)it = (TE)it(TE)it 1
• Finally, total factor productivity growth is calculated as:
 (TFP )it =  (TP )it + (TE)it + (SE)it
Table 3.2 below reports some summary statistics for TFP growth, and its com-
ponents. We observe negative productivity growth for export starters in 2005, 2006,
and 2009, while the average growth is positive in 2007 and 2008. Additionally, we
find that scale effects are key component of TFP growth for both export starters and
56Appendix 2 Section B provides a description of scale effects.
57As Koopmans (1951) highlights a producer is considered as technically efficient, if it cannot
produce more without using more of some input.
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newer exporters. In the following section we highlight some methodological issues in
LBE analysis, and review some potential solutions to these issues.
61
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3.4. The Effect of Exporting on TFP Growth and Its
Components
3.4.1. Methodological Issues
Although the effects of exporting on firm productivity have been examined via
several different methods so far, two core approaches can be distinguished in the
literature.58 The first one is a panel regressions approach, introduced by Bernard
and Jensen (1999). However, this method is criticized by some researchers, who claim
that a basic comparison of exporting firms to all non-exporting firms provides results
suffering from selection bias, a point which we explain below. The second approach
used by most of the recent studies on this literature is treatment models, which
compare potential outcomes for an individual/firm under treatment, and without
treatment. This method is adapted to the literature on LBE by considering export
entry as a treatment. However, the main problem with this method is that one
cannot observe what would have happened to a firm if it had not entered the export
market. In other words, we can observe a firm in only one situation, because it is
either an exporter or a non-exporter at time t. We can illustrate this problem by
following Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004). Let’s
assume that the difference between the performance of exporters (treated firms), and
non-exporters (non-treated firms)  i is the following:
 i = E[Yi | Di = 1]  E[Yi | Di = 0]
where Yi is the outcome of the treatment effect on a firm in terms of whether
they receive the treatment Di, or not, and  i shows how successful the treatment
58Some of the other estimation methods are also used in the literature to test the learning by
exporting hypothesis, such as the Granger causality test, random effects and fixed effects panel
estimation methods.
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program is.59
However, there is a serious problem with this approach. As we mentioned, we
only have information for a specific individual/firm in one situation. In other words,
we cannot observe Yi | Di = 1, and Yi | Di = 0 at the same time. In order to tackle
this problem, the population average of treatment effect (ATE) is considered as the
measurement of the program effect:
DATE = E[Yi(1) | Di = 1]  E[Yi(0) | Di = 0] (3.3)
which gives the difference between the outcome of the treated participants, Yi(1),
and the outcome of non-treated participants, Yi(0). However, Heckman et al. (1997)
highlight that ATE might not be a relevant measurement, since it considers individ-
uals/firms who actually are not targeted by the treatment program, namely Yi(0).
They propose that one should focus only on the individuals who participated in the
program in order to calculate an unbiased treatment effect. According to Heckman
et al. (1997), a treatment effect is measured by the difference between the expected
outcomes of an individual/firm with and without treatment. So, the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT) is:
 ATT = E[Yi(1)  Yi(0) | Di = 1] = E[Yi(1) | Di = 1]  E[Yi(0) | Di = 1]
which gives the difference between the outcome of a treated firm which obtains
after exporting and the potential outcome that would have obtained if it had never
exported.
This approach enables us to verify what an export starter would have had if it had
never exported by using a hypothetical counterfactual. Obviously, we are not able
to observe both outcomes for the same firm. We can only observe E[Yi(1) | Di = 1],
while E[Yi(0) | Di = 1] (outcome of the export starter if they had not exported)
59As mentioned above, the treatment is export entry, so, Di = 1 for export starters.
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is unknown. Based on this fact, Heckman et al. (1997) define the selection bias
problem by rearranging equation (3.3). If we add and subtract E[Yi(0) | Di = 1],
equation (3.3) can be written as:
E[Yi(1) | Di = 1]  E[Yi(0) | Di = 0]| {z }
ATE
+ E[Yi(0) | Di = 1]  E[Yi(0) | Di = 1]
which can be written as:
E[Yi(1)  Yi(0) | Di = 1]| {z }
ATT
+ E[Yi(0) | Di = 1]  E[Yi(0) | Di = 0]| {z }
bias term
(3.4)
Equation (3.4) represents the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) plus
a bias term.60 Thus, Heckman et al. (1997) conclude that a basic comparison be-
tween treated individuals (export starters in our case) and all non-treated individuals
(never-exporters) will provide biased results.
It is a straightforward conclusion that the bias would be zero if the treated firms
were randomly selected. In other words, if the treated and control groups have
the same observable and non-observable characteristics, the bias will be zero, where
E[Yi(0) | Di = 1] = E[Yi(0) | Di = 0]. However, the random selection is generally
observed in experimental data, where there is no self-selection. In social sciences,
researchers normally deal with non-experimental data, where a self-selection problem
exists. In fact, in Chapter 2, we have already verified that better (or larger) firms
tend to self-select as exporters in some industries. Thus, we know that our data on
the export market are not randomly selected. This suggests that a direct comparison
between exporters and all never-exporters will not provide reliable results in terms
of the direction of the causality. In other words, selection bias is an important
problem to deal with in this study. There are several methods that can be utilized
to overcome the selection bias problem, and we review most of these methods in
Appendix 2 Section C.
60The selection bias can be written as B(ATTt) = E[Yi(0) | Di = 1]  E[Y (0) | Di = 0]
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3.4.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
Considering the benefits and drawbacks of all the methods that we review in Ap-
pendix 2 Section C, we have decided to employ a combination of the propensity score
matching and difference-in-difference strategy (PSM-DID) to take the selection bias
issue into account. One of the main advantages of the use of PSM-DID with respect
to the traditional difference-in-difference method (DID) is that this method reduces
the bias component which was illustrated in Equation (3.4). Additionally, accord-
ing to Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), combining a PSM estimator with the DID
approach improves the quality of matching significantly, since it removes possible
unobserved, time-invariant and firm-specific effects.61 Because of these advantages
of the PSM-DID approach, we prefer to employ this method in order to evaluate the
impact of exports on productivity.62
3.4.2.1. Combining PSM with the DID Estimator
As we describe in Appendix 2 Section C, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduce
an approach based on a computation of a probability of receiving treatment (propen-
sity score), and show that a matching can be performed based only on this single
variable. Obtaining a matched sample, a propensity matching estimator can easily
compute sample averages of the two groups and calculate the difference which gives
treatment effect on treated. A matching estimator takes the form:
M(ATTt)) =
1
ni
P
i2{D⇤i = 1}
h
Yit  
P
j2{D⇤j = 0}w(i, j)(Yjt)
i
where w(i, j) is the weight given to the jth observation of controls in constructing
the counterfactual to the ith treated firm, and ni is the number of treated observa-
61This method controls for the selection bias by comparing changes in the outcome, before and
after the exporting, for export starter firm and similar firms from the control group.
62Following the seminal paper of Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), many recent papers utilize
this method in the literature, such as Gorg et al. (2008); Volpe and Carballo (2008); Girma et al.
(2003), and De Loecker (2007).
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tions.63 Y is the outcome variable (for instance TFP). Di = 1 and Di = 0 respec-
tively denote the group of starters and never-exporters. As we mentioned, matching
procedure controls for the selection bias arising from observable firm characteristics,
while it cannot solve a potential selection issue coming from any unobservable effects.
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) show that PSM-DID estimator performs better than
both PSM and DID when they are used alone. Following this approach, we combine
PSM with DID. Now, our new estimator considers the outcomes of treatment as dif-
ferences in outcomes after and before the treatment for the treated and non-treated
firms. Thus the estimator can be written as:
MDID PSM(ATTt) ) =
1
ni
P
i2{D⇤i = 1}
h
(Yi,post   Yi,pre) 
P
j2{D⇤j = 0}w(i, j)(Yj,post   Yj,pre)
i
(3.5)
where the subscripts, post and pre, denote the periods after and before entry to
export markets. As equation (3.5) shows, the DID model allows us to estimate the
difference between differences of outcome for exporters and non-exporters. Let Yi,post,
and Yj,post stand for post-exporting, and Yi,pre, and Yj,pre represent pre-exporting total
factor productivities for exporters, and non-exporters, respectively. Basically, this
is the mechanism by which the DID estimator removes unobservable firm specific
characteristics, such as effects of common shocks. We then compute the PSM-DID
estimator for three periods after entry into the export market, with respect to the
year prior to entry (t-1).Thus, we obtain ATT effects for entry period, (t-1 to t), and
the following three years: t-1 to t+1, t-1 to t+2 and finally t-1 to t+3.
3.4.2.2. Estimation Procedure
We implement the PSM-DID method in three stages; in the first stage, we estimate
a propensity score of export entry based upon the variables which could affect the
entry decision. There are two important decisions to be made at this stage. The first
63Different matching algorithms use different ways to calculate the weight.
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one concerns the model specification to be used for the propensity score estimation.
Any discrete choice model can be used at this stage. In order to be consistent with
Chapter 2, we prefer to use the probit model to estimate propensity scores. The
second important decision concerns the variables to be included in the analysis. The
variables that we include in our model are selected based on the relevant literature,
as well as our findings from Chapter 2.64 As Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) highlight
only variables that are unaffected by the treatment (exporting) can be included in
the model in order to avoid potential endogeneity issues.65 In order to overcome this
issue, we include variables measured before foreign market participation. Namely,
we include variables at t-1, since a firm i enters the export market at t. Eventually,
we include all relevant variables (lagged one year) which have an effect on outcome.
We use the following probit model in order to estimate propensity scores for each
firm:
Pr(Starterit = 1) = F(TFPit 1, ageit 1, Sizeit 1,Wageit 1, CIit 1, Dis, Dir)
where F is a normal cumulative distribution function. Starterit is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 for a firm that does not export for at least two years,
starts exporting at t, and continues exporting in the following periods. For instance,
firms considered as starters in 2005 do not export in 2003 and 2004. They keep
exporting in the years following the point at which they are observed. For this
reason, as Table 3.3 illustrates, we have starters from years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
and 2009.
64From the analysis we conduct in Chapter 2, we know that selected variables have an effect on
export decision. For further information, please see Bernard et al. (2003), or Bernard et al. (2006).
65We address this problem in detail in Chapter 2, where we examine the self-selection effect.
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TFP stands for the estimated total factor productivity. We use two TFP mea-
sures here. The first is TFPLevPet which is the one we obtained in Chapter 2 from a
Cobb-Douglas production function, while the second measure, TFPSFA, is estimated
from a translog production function. The age variable represents the number of years
that a firm has been in operation, while Size stands for the number of employees.
Wage and CI represent average wage and capital intensity respectively. Finally we
include industry, and region dummies. At the second stage, matching is done be-
tween export starters (treated) and never-exporters (control) based on the estimated
propensity score.66 De Loecker (2007) shows that sector-level matching may improve
the quality of matching. However, when we perform matching for each sector sep-
arately the number of starters we obtain is very low for many sectors, due to the
low number of observations. Therefore we have decided to use pooled data at this
stage, since this gives us opportunity to use the largest possible quantity of data.67
We employ matching procedure for each year between 2005 and 2009 separately.
66We use the Stata routine (psmatch2) provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) to perform match-
ing the procedure.
67Girma et. al. (2004) and Maggioni (2009) report that they obtain similar results from matching
with pooled data, and matching for each sector.
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3.4.2.3. Testing the Matching Quality
As we discuss in Appendix 2 Section E, unlike the traditional matching methods
which conditions on all covariates, PSM conditions only on the propensity score.
For this reason, we need to make sure that the preferred matching algorithm is able
to balance the distribution of all variables for export starters and never-exporters.
More precisely, a successful matching procedure should provide a matched sample
where the covariates are well-balanced. The most commonly used methods to eval-
uate matching quality in this literature are a standard t-test and the balancing test
introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).68 A simple two-sample t-test exam-
ines whether the covariates for treated and control groups are significantly different.
According to this approach, if these two groups are matched successfully, then there
should be no significant difference between them. Another method, the Rosenbaum
and Rubin approach, provides detailed information with regard to the success of
the matching method in terms of bias reduction. It shows the bias before and after
matching, and reports a bias reduction rate, which indicates the high quality of the
matching.
Table 3.4 presents our findings from both tests for the matched sample for 2005,
and shows that no differences were found in the average level of covariates of export
starters and never-exporters. For instance, the average TFP of export starters is 6.48,
while it is 5.98 for newer-exporters before matching (with p-value of 0.00). However,
after matching, the average level of TFP for export starters becomes 6.46, while
the average for never-exporters becomes 6.41. The p-value after matching becomes
0.69, which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis for equality of means of
variables after matching. In other words, the Kernel approach successfully matches
both groups. Table 3.4 also reports the standard bias for each covariate before and
68Please see Appendix 2 Section E for a technical description of the balancing test.
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after the matching. For instance, the standardized bias for TFP between both groups
is 42% before matching, while it reduces to 4% after matching. We observe that the
bias is reduced to below 5% for all variables after matching, which indicates that
we have a nicely balanced matched group. The diagrams below Table 3.4 report the
performance of other matching methods in terms of matching quality for 2005.69 The
second and third diagrams show standard % bias across covariates after matching
from Nearest Neighbour and Mahalanobis methods, respectively. Clearly, the Kernel
method provides the best results amongst the three approaches. For this reason, we
decide to use Kernel method to examine LBE in the following section.
Besides, Figure 3.1 (below) shows that matching results from the Kernel method
also satisfies the common support assumption of PSM.70 Figure 3.1 illustrates that
the Kernel method generates a good common support region where propensity scores
of export starters and never-exporters overlap.71
69Tables A2.2 to A2.5 in Appendix 2 Section A provides matching quality tests results for 2006,
2007, 2008, and 2009.
70PSM assumes that a successful matching algorithm creates a common support region where
the propensity scores of individuals from both treated and control groups overlap.
71Figure 3.2 in Appendix 2 Section A provides common support results for 2006, 2007, 2008, and
2009.
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3.5. Results
In the final stage of the matching procedure, Equation (3.5) is estimated to obtain
average treatment effect on treated (ATT). In this chapter, ATT refers to the effect
of exporting on productivity growth for export starters. More precisely, any positive
and significant value of ATT implies a post-exporting productivity improvement
which never-exporters do not experience. Thus, a positive and significant value of
ATT confirms the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.
There are several available matching methods such as Nearest Neighbour (NN),
Mahalanobis, and Kernel.72 As we discuss in previous section, Kernel matching
provides the best results in terms of the matching quality. For this reason, we report
our findings from the Kernel estimator, while we also show the findings from the
Nearest Neighbour (NN) and Mahalanobis matching methods in Appendix 2 Section
A, which will serve as a robustness check with respect to the effect of exporting on
productivity.73
Table 3.5 reports the effect of exporting on productivity growth (ATT) for 2007,
2008 and 2009.74 We use three different productivity measures. LP stands for labour
productivity, while TFPLevPet represents total factor productivity, which we obtained
in Chapter 2 from a Cobb-Douglas production function. As we already mentioned,
TFPSFA stands for total factor productivity obtained from a translog production
function which allows for VRTS. Additionally, we examine a decomposition of the
productivity growth effects of export market entry. TP, SE, and TE represent tech-
nical efficiency change, scale efficiency change and efficiency change: these are the
components of TFPSFA growth.
We observe some interesting patterns from our results: (i) Any impact of export-
72We provide a brief discussion on different matching methods in Appendix 2 Section D.
73Please see Appendix 2 Section A, Tables A2.7 to A2.11
74Table A2.6, in Appendix 2 Section A, reports our findings for 2005 and 2006.
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ing is predominantly attributed to a change in scale efficiency; (ii) Our results from
the two different TFP measures (TFPLevPet and TFPSFA) are usually the opposite
of one another.
Table 3.5 shows that when we consider TFPLevPet as a measure of productivity,
we find that firms which start exporting in 2007 enjoy 8.6% productivity growth
from t-1 to t+2 (two years after entry). The rate of productivity growth for export
starters from t-1 to t+3 (three years after entry) is around 9.6% higher than that of
never-exporters. However, when we consider TFP SFA as a measure of productivity,
we only find statistically significant productivity growth three years after entry. In
Table 3.5, the final column for 2007 (t+3) reports 11.1% productivity growth which
is slightly higher that the finding from TFPLevPet (9.6%). More interestingly, we
find that technical and efficiency changes play no role in overall productivity growth,
and all the growth is due to scale effects.
For the firms which entered the export market in 2008, we uncover evidence of a
negative exporting effect on TFP SFA growth of -6.4%. More importantly, we show
that the decline in productivity growth is due to a loss in scale efficiency. Figure 3.3
illustrates that scale inefficiency increases when a firm experiencing DRTS produces
more, or when a firm facing IRTS produces less. In the light of this, the negative
exporting effect on TFP SFA growth may be due to those firms that entered the
export market in 2008 possibly experiencing DRTS. Following their entrance to the
export market, they suffer from scale inefficiency as a result of an increase in their
output. On the other hand, we do not observe such an effect for the same period
when we consider TFPLevPet as a measure of productivity growth. We believe that,
since TFPLevPet overlooks the scale effects, it fails to capture the growth effect of
exporting, which is detected when we consider TFP SFA. In Appendix 2 Section A
we show that the findings from different matching methods also confirm these results.
The results for firms that enter the export market in 2009 are also interesting.
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Again, we find a positive treatment effect of exporting on TFPLevPet growth for the
entry year, t, as well as the following two years (t+1 and t+2). On the other hand,
the effects of export on productivity disappear when we measure productivity growth
via TFP SFA. In other words, we cannot confirm any significant effect of exporting
on TFPSFA growth for the periods when we find a significant effect on TFPLevPet
growth. These results are also robust to applying different matching methods.
As we mentioned in Chapter 2, labour productivity (LP) is not a preferred mea-
sure of productivity. For this reason our main interest is in TFPLevPet and TFPSFA.
However, we report the effects of exporting on labour productivity too. This will
give us a chance to compare LP results to our findings from TFP measures. We
find that exporting has a positive and significant effect on LP only for the firms
which start exporting in 2005 and 2007. Table A2.6 reports a positive effect of 5.6%
increase in LP in the year of foreign market entry (2005). The first column in Table
3.5 provides our findings for the firms which start exporting in 2007. We observe
7.2% and 8.7% (7.2+1.5) increases in LP, in two and three years after export market
entry respectively. Interestingly, we find that the productivity effects of exporting
on LP and TFP are not coexisting. In other words, we find no significant effects on
TFP for the periods when we observe positive and significant effects on LP. Using
different matching methods (Nearest Neighbour, and Mahalanobis), the LP results
from Kernel matching are confirmed.
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3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we aimed to examine the effect of exporting on productivity
growth which is, we believe, a highly policy relevant issue. For a policy maker, it is
essential to identify which way the causality between productivity and export runs.
Assuming that learning by exporting effects exist, several studies in the literature
suggest that governments should support firms which aim to export in order to
stimulate both firm and industry level productivity improvements. This is a valid
policy, as long as firms learn from exporting. However, if exports do not enhance
firm productivity, then the policies helping firms which aim to be an exporter will be
questionable.75 For this reason, it is important to examine the links between exports
and firm productivity thoroughly, and to understand the mechanisms behind the
learning by exporting effects, if there are any.
Initially, we reported that some firms in the UK experience variable returns to
scale, which highlights the potential role of scale effects in TFP growth. Based on
this finding, first, we aimed to construct a TFP measure which accounts for scale
effects, and obtained TFP SFA by employing a translog production function which
allows for variable returns to scale. Second, we decomposed TFP SFA growth into
its components by utilizing SFA. Finally we showed the effect of exporting on these
three components of TFP: technical change, scale change, and efficiency change.
We observed some interesting patterns from our results. First, we found evidence
in favour of an LBE effect when we considered the TFP measure which we obtained
75On the other hand, industry level productivity increase will automatically arise as a conse-
quence of the self-selection mechanism, even without any government intervention. As Melitz
(2003) suggests, more productive firms self-select to enter the export market, while less productive
firms only operate in the domestic market, and the least productive firms exit the market: which
in turn influences resource allocation within the industry. Since the least productive firms leave
the market, resources will be allocated to more productive firms, which in turn raises aggregate
productivity in the industry. Thus, in an industry, if self-selection occurs, while LBE effect does
not exist, then firm and industry level productivity improvements will be observed even without
government intervention.
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from a Cobb-Douglas production function (TFPLevPet). However, the evidence of an
LBE effect largely disappeared when we considered the TFP measure which accounts
for scale effects (TFPSFA). Second, and more importantly, we showed that any
productivity growth effects of exporting are predominantly attributable to a change
in scale efficiency. In other words, the main source of TFP growth is not technical
improvements, but scale efficiency improvements.
In this chapter, we used an unbalanced panel data-set obtained from the FAME
database. This data is criticized by Harris and Li (2008) who claim that the dataset
is biased towards large enterprises.76 If this is the case, then this might explain
our findings regarding the scale effects to some extent. More precisely, larger firms
which start exporting may enjoy greater improvements in terms of scale efficiency,
as a result of increasing demand and production. Future work should aim to extend
our findings to other datasets.
We believe that our findings regarding the scale effects are very interesting, and
they suggest some questions to be addressed in future studies. For instance, given
that scale effects play a key role in TFP growth, it would be interesting to investigate
what are the available strategies for firms to achieve scale efficiency. Moreover,
knowing that scale effects are the dominant component of TFP growth, we will
examine the effect of scale efficiency on firms’ internationalization decisions, in order
to uncover any self-selection effects in terms of scale efficiency.
76Although this is not the case for our dataset, their approach is worth considering.
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Appendix 2 - Section A:
Tables
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Appendix 2 - Section B:
The relationship between returns to scale and scale efficiency
A firm producing with constant returns to scale is considered to be scale efficient
(Coelli, 2005). According to this approach, firms producing with variable returns to
scale (either increasing or decreasing returns) can improve their efficiency by chang-
ing their scale of production/operation. This can easily be shown in a one-input,
one-output production technology scenario. Suppose there are three firms producing
at the points A, B and C respectively. As Coelli (2005) explains, since all these three
firms are producing on a production frontier, they are considered to be technically
efficient. However, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, these three firms have different levels of
productivity, since they are producing on different production frontiers.77 The firm
producing at point A could improve its productivity by increasing the scale of its
production (moving towards B), since it is producing within the increasing returns
to scale part of the production function. Similarly, as Figure 3.3 shows (below),
the firm producing at point C is producing within the decreasing returns to scale
part of the production function. Thus, it could enjoy an increase in productivity
if it decreases its scale of production (moving towards B). On the other hand, the
firm producing at point B cannot improve its productivity by adjusting its scale of
production, since it is scale efficient.
77Consider that the level of productivity is measured by the ratio of output and input levels (q/x)
which is the slope of a frontier. Thus a steeper line is associated with higher productivity.
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Appendix 2 Section C:
Selection Bias and Alternative Solutions
Several methods can be utilized to overcome the selection bias problem. The
first one we will review is an instrumental variable (IV) estimation. This method
can be used to overcome the problem of the selection biases as long as appropriate
instruments for Di can be found. The method requires instrumental variables that
affect participation in the treatment (decision to export) but do not directly affect
the outcome (total factor productivity). The main issue with the IV estimation is
the limitations on the availability of such instruments (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).
Another issue might arise if a treatment affects participants heterogeneously. In ad-
dition to this heterogeneity problem, if the treatment effects are correlated with the
instruments, then IV estimation will not be able to estimate the average treatment
effect (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003). In such a case, the method provides estima-
tions for the local impact of participation on the participants who react to a change
in the value of the instrument (Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)).78
The standard Heckman two-stage approach is the second approach that we will
review. This method aims to tackle the self-selection issue in two stages. In the
first stage, by utilizing a logit or probit estimator, predicted values of the probability
are obtained. These values are used to calculate the sample selectivity correction
terms which are used at the second stage of the procedure (Heckman, 1979). In this
way, the Heckman two-stage approach aims to control for the correlation between
participation decision and treatment. However, this approach has been criticized by
several researchers, such as Angrist and Krueger (2001) who claim that this procedure
produces non-robust results. Puhani (2000), in a survey, specifically highlights a co-
78On the other hand, if all firms react to the treatment (export) in same way, the LATE will be
equal to the standard IV approach (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003).
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linearity issue as a weakness of this approach.
The difference-in-difference (DID) estimator is another method that is used for
calculating treatment effect when the information for pre-treatment and post-treatment
is available. The impact of treatment can be written as:
(E[Yit(1) | Di = 1] E[Yit0 (0) | Di = 1]) {E[Yit(0) | Di = 0] E[Yit0 (0) | Di = 0])
where pre-treatment and post-treatment are denoted as t0and t, respectively.
The first two terms in the above equation show the change in outcomes for partic-
ipants who received treatment, while the rest represents non-participants’ experience
between the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. However, this method im-
poses a strong assumption that the experience of participant if it never exported is
the same with the experience of non-participants.79 In other words, the assumption
suggests that the effect of treatment on the outcome of treated individuals/firms
would have been equal to those do not receive the treatment, in the absence of
participation. The problem is that this assumption fails if the treated group is a
self-selected sub-group that has characteristics that enable them do better (in terms
of outcome) if they receive treatment. Thus, this assumption does not exclude the
possibility of selection on unobservable characteristics (Hsieh, 2009).
Rubin (1977) proposed a matching method to solve the selection bias problem
which arises from the unobservable counterfactual, and this approach has become one
of the most popular methods in the “program evaluation” literature. This method
evaluates the effect of a treatment (export in our case) by comparing outcomes (total
factor productivity) for a treated group (export starters) to those for similar partic-
ipants in a comparison group (never exporters), controlling for all covariates. The
idea is to match each treated individual/firm with a non-treated observation based
79This assumption can be shown as: {E[Yit(0) | Di = 1]   E[Yit0 (0) | Di = 1]} = {E[Yit(0) |
Di = 0]   E[Yit0 (0) | Di = 0], thanks to this assumption, the unobserved term can be written as:
E[Yit(0) | Di = 1] = E[Yit0 (0) | Di = 1] + {E[Yit(0) | Di = 0]  E[Yit0 (0) | Di = 0].
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on all observable individual characteristics, and obtain a matched sample where the
treated and non-treated groups are the same in all characteristics. This suggests
that in the absence of treatment the outcomes will be the same for both groups.80
As a result, this method provides pairs of control and treated individuals/firms, and
solves the unobserved counterfactual problem which we highlight above.
On the other hand, there are a number of issues with the matching procedure
worth mentioning. The traditional matching method requires a rich dataset includ-
ing all variables that have a potential impact on participation in a treatment, in
addition to the variables that have an impact on outcomes. This requirement leads
to an issue known as the problem of dimensionality, when there are differences in
several characteristics of treated and control individuals/firms (Rosenbaum and Ru-
bin, 1983).81 Because there are several observed covariates in our data that can be
used for the matching procedure, such as total factor productivity, age, size, labour
productivity, and region, industry or time effects, the traditional matching approach
is not appropriate for our study.
An alternative matching method, propensity score matching, is proposed by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in order to tackle the dimensionality problem. They
introduce a propensity score, a probability of receiving treatment, given a set of
covariates, and show that a matching can be performed based only on this propen-
sity score which can be considered a summary of all observed covariates.82 They
also show that the matching procedure is valid, if the conditional distribution of
the covariates, given a function of P(X), is the same for both treated, and control
individuals/firms.83 This can be shown with the following:
E[Yi(1)  Yi(0)|P (X)] = E[Yi(1)|Di = 1, P (X)]  E[Yi(0)|Di = 0, P (X)]
80This implies that E[Yi(0) | Di = 1] = E[Yi(0) | Di = 0]. Thus matching assumes that Yi(1)
and Yi(0) are independent of Di, and eliminates selection bias.
81Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) name this problem as the curse of dimensionality.
82Propensity score is usually calculated by utilizing probit or logit regressions.
83Y (0) ? D | X =) Y (0) ? D | P (X) where P (X) = Pr(D = 1 | X)
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To sum up, this method enables researchers to tackle the selection bias problem
by performing matching based on a single variable, propensity score, instead of all
covariates.84
Although propensity score matching is currently the preferred methodology in
the literature on learning by exporting, some researchers criticize the mechanism
behind this method. For instance, Eliasson et al. (2009) suggest that export market
participation is a dynamic treatment where some firms decide to enter to the export
market earlier than others. Eliasson et al. (2009) also claim that, since the propensity
score matching considers export starters as a treated group, while it does consider
never-exporters as a control group, it generates an upward bias. Moreover, they
suggest that “not-yet” entrants in the export market, rather than never-exporters
should be considered as the control group. Additionally, Fernandes and Isgut (2007)
also address an upward bias problem with the estimates of propensity score matching.
They argue that unobserved productivity shocks might play an important role in
firms’ decisions to enter the export market, and if this is the case, then the key
assumption of the propensity matching method is violated.85
84This can be shown as: E[Yi(1)   Yi(0) | P (X)] = E[Yi(1) | Di = 1, P (X)]   E[Yi(0) | Di =
0, P (X)]
85The unconfoundedness assumption suggests that the expected outcomes of treated, and control
groups are conditionally independent from the treatment (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004).
Please see footnote 86.
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Appendix 2 Section D:
Different Matching Methods
There are several different matching methods available, and it is not an easy task
to choose the right one. One would expect to obtain similar results from differ-
ent methods, since asymptotically all propensity score matching estimators are the
same. For small samples, however, the method choice might be important (Heckman,
Ichimura and Todd, 1997). In this section, we will review some of the available PSM
estimators, and compare and contrast their strengths and weaknesses.86 Table A2.11
illustrates the bias-variance trade-off for the available PSM estimator. The litera-
ture suggests that there is no single best approach which can be used for all studies.
Thus, researchers should try several methods to make sure that results provided by
different approaches are robust (Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon, 2002).
Mahalanobis Distance Matching:
This approach is a widely used method of multivariate matching (Rubin, 1980),
and it is an alternative to the PSM method. This approach calculates the distance
between any two vectors, Xi and Xj, with the Mahalanobis distance function rather
than a propensity score:
md(Xi  Xj) = {(Xi  Xj)0S 1(Xi  Xj)} 12
where S is the sample covariance matrix of X. ATT is estimated by matching
each treated individuals with N numbers of closest individuals from control group
where the distance between Xi and Xj is measured by md(.) function.
86See Smith and Todd (2005) for technical details.
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Nearest Neighbour Matching (NN):
This estimator creates a matched pair from treated and control individuals which
have the closest propensity score. The method comes with several options, such as
matching with replacement and without replacement. If the matching with replace-
ment option is chosen, then observations in the control group can be paired with
more than one treated observation. As Table A2.11 shows, this method is useful,
since using it increases the matching quality, by reducing variance. On the other
hand, if matching without replacement is employed, then bias is reduced, since we
can obtain very similar observations. However, it provides less efficient estimates as
a result of reduced sample size.
Caliper and Radius Matching:
If the closest neighbour in terms of propensity score is not close enough, NN may
produce bad matches. One can overcome this issue by setting a caliper which makes
sure that the propensity score differences between treated and control individuals
are capped. However, this method may significantly reduce the number of matched
pairs which results a variance increase in the estimation results. Another issue is
that there are no criteria to assess a correct level for the caliper.
Kernel Matching:
Unlike NN, caliper, and radius matching, this method performs matching based on
a weighted average of control group observations. More precisely, a counterfactual
outcome for treated individuals is created by using all individuals in the control
group.87 As Table A2.11 reports, the use of this method reduces bias, since more
information is used. However, this method is not perfect either. When performing
87On the other hand, other methods consider a few observations from the control group as a
potential match for a treated individual.
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Kernel matching, one has to choose a bandwidth parameter. This causes a problem
which is similar to the issue with caliper mentioned above, since it is not easy to
choose the correct level of bandwidth parameter.
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Appendix 2 Section E:
Testing Matching Quality
The basic idea of all approaches is to compare the situation before and after match-
ing and check whether any differences remain after conditioning on the propensity
score. If there are differences, matching on the score was not (completely) successful.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) Approach:
According to this approach, a standard bias can be calculated based on a ratio of
the difference of sample means, and the square root of the average of sample variances
for both control and treated groups. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggests that the
standard bias before matching can be computed by:
SBbefore = 100
(X¯1 X¯0)p
0.5(V¯1(X)+V¯0(X))
The bias after matching is calculated by:
SBafter = 100
( ¯X1M  ¯X0M )p
0.5( ¯V1M (X)+ ¯V0M (X))
For the treatment group, X1 and V1 represent the mean and variance before
matching, respectively, while X0 and V0 are the same values for the control group.
For the matched sample, X1M and V1M stand for the mean and variance, while X0M
and V0M are the same values for the control group. A matching is considered as
successful if it could reduce the bias below 5%, although this not a formally verified
rule (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005)
T-Test:
A two-sample t-test is another method to examine if there are significant differ-
ences between the mean of variables for both groups. According to this approach,
100
differences in both groups, in terms of mean values, are expected before matching,
but, a successful match is supposed to eliminate those differences for each variable.
The advantage of the t-test is that it shows whether the results are statistically
significant.
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Chapter 4: Firm Productivity and International Or-
ganization of Production of a Firm: Do Motives for
Mergers Matter?
4.1. Introduction
Following the trade liberalization wave in the world economy, the number of
firms involved in international trade activities has dramatically increased. Cross-
border mergers and greenfield FDI have become the main strategies through which
these firms internationalize their production process. Additionally, over the last
two decades cross-border mergers, have become more popular compared to green-
field FDI. The share of cross-border mergers in total foreign direct investment (FDI)
flows has increased and almost caught up with the share of greenfield FDIs (UNCTAD
2008).88 Following the recent trend in the international trade literature, the litera-
ture on trade and investment has started to uncover the effects of firm-productivity
on cross-border mergers.89
In a recent paper, Nocke and Yeaple (2007: here-after NY) examines the relation-
ship between firm efficiency and foreign market entry decisions in a heterogeneous
firm framework. In their paper, NY consider that the efficiency motive is the main
driver of merger activities, and show that the most productive firms engage in cross-
border mergers, while relatively less efficient firms choose greenfield FDI, and the
least efficient firms export or only serve the domestic market.90
88As a result of the global economic crisis of 2008-09, both total FDI flow, and the level of cross-
border mergers decreased dramatically, but, recently they have tended to recover from the crisis
episodes (UNCTAD 2013).
89The heterogeneous nature of FDI has been largely neglected by the international trade litera-
ture. However, some recent studies that we survey in the following section address this issue.
90This result is valid for Sector M in NY, which is the main interest of this paper.
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The present chapter contributes to the literature by extending NY’s approach
to include the industry concentration effect of cross-border mergers. Focusing on
a monopolistically competitive environment, NY ignore any strategic motives for
a merger. In this chapter, we introduce the market-concentration effect of cross-
border mergers by developing a two-country oligopoly model of product differentia-
tion, where firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity.
The main finding of this chapter is that, in the presence of a higher market-
concentration under merger, a relatively low productive firm may prefer cross-border
merger while a relatively high productive firm may prefer either greenfield FDI or
export. Our results are more likely to hold if the product differentiation is low, so
that the associated competition effect is large.
In contrast to Helpman et al. (2004), and NY, our findings suggest that a strict
productivity ranking in terms of the choice of foreign market entry mode may not
occur.91 Empirical evidence on this issue is very limited. Some recent empirical
studies provide mixed results regarding the relationship between entry mode decision
and firm productivity, which is consistent with our predictions. Trax (2011), for
instance, finds that the most efficient UK firms choose cross-border merger over
greenfield FDI in high intangibles industries, while she cannot find such evidence in
the low intangibles sector. On the contrary, Raff et al. (2012) show that the most
productive Japanese firms prefer greenfield investment over cross-border merger.92
We believe that the findings from our model, which shows that the relationship
between productivity and merger/greenfield FDI decisions is non-monotonic, can
offer an explanation for the mixed results from empirical studies in the literature.
91According to Helpman et al. (2004) the most productive firms undertake FDI, while less produc-
tive firms export. Nocke and Yeaple (2007) extend this analysis by considering the heterogeneous
nature of FDI.
92Nocke and Yeaple (2008) also find that more productive firms choose greenfield FDI, while less
efficients firms prefer cross-border merger, if there are factor price differences between countries in
terms of wages. They also show that greenfield FDI is not a preferred strategy for neither type of
firm, when the factor price differences vanish.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 4.2, we provide a review of recent
theoretical and empirical literature, then we describe the model and discuss the
results in sections 4.3 and 4.4. Finally, in section 4.6 we offer some concluding
remarks and a future research agenda.
4.2. Related Literature
Two recent developments in the literature on FDI are worth mentioning.93 Until
recently, the literature has focused on the determinants of an internationalization
decision of a firm by treating firms within an industry as homogeneous. However,
the emerging empirical literature shows that firms selling abroad are rare among
all producers in both developing and developed countries, and their decisions to
participate in international markets are not random (Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
Furthermore, Bernard and Jensen (1999) show that firms engaging in international
trade are different in terms of their size, productivity and capital intensity than those
who operate domestically only.
Following these new findings, the seminal work of Melitz (2003) and Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) provided theoretical proof for the link between
firm-level productivity and the export decisions of firms. Melitz (2003) introduced
firm-level productivity heterogeneity by adapting Hopenhayn’s (1992) model to a
dynamic model of a monopolistic competitive industry. The main finding of Melitz
(2003) is that the productivity of a firm determines its decision to enter the inter-
national market. More precisely, more productive firms enter foreign markets, since
only they can overcome sunk entry costs, while less productive firms operate only
domestically. Finally, the least productive firms stop producing, and exit the market.
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) contribute to this branch of FDI literature
93See Antràs and Yeaple (2014) or Markusen (2002) for a survey.
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by explicitly considering two ways to serve the foreign market -export and FDI- and
they show that only the most productive firms within an industry engage in FDI,
while the less efficient firms serve foreign markets via export.94
The second important development in the FDI literature concerns the composi-
tion of FDI. Until recently, researchers such as Helpman et al. (2004), and Head
and Riese (2003), have mainly focused on two alternative ways of accessing foreign
markets, exports and FDI. In spite of the fact that cross-border merger is considered
to be an important type of FDI, the relevant literature did not pay much attention
to this aspect.95 Some recent papers, on the other hand, such as Ferrett (2005),
Bjorvatn (2004), and Neary (2009), explicitly model the two different components of
FDI to examine the internationalization decisions of firms.
Ferrett (2005), for instance, examines firms’ choice between greenfield investment
and acquisition-FDI in a model where the decision of a firm between the two is en-
dogenous. He shows that acquisitions may dominate greenfield investment by consid-
ering the role of endogenous R&D investment. This finding highlights the importance
of taking both components of FDI in to account in a single framework. Bjorvatn
(2004) also examines firms’ choice between greenfield investment and cross-border
merger, and shows a positive relationship between economic integration and incen-
tive for cross-border mergers.96 Although Ferrett (2005), Bjorvatn (2004), and Neary
(2009) highlight the importance of modeling greenfield investment and cross-border
merger simultaneously, unlike our study, they ignore the productivity differences
amongst firms.
94Mrázová and Neary (2013) confirms the findings of Helpman et al. (2004) only if a firm’s
variable costs of production and the transportation costs it faces are complementary. Moreover,
they show that it may not be the case when they consider different preference structures, where
firms cannot be sorted on the basis of their productivity in a way that Helpman et al. (2004)
proposed.
95(UNCTAD 2008).
96Similarly, they report a positive relationship between lower level of trade cost and incentive for
cross-border mergers.
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A recent paper by NY combines the recent developments in the literature on
FDI. In their model, they consider firm heterogeneity along with the heterogeneous
nature of FDI, where firms which want to sell abroad have the following options:
export, greenfield FDI, and cross-border merger. In their paper, firm heterogeneity
arises from the fact that firms have different types of capability. NY consider two
sectors: sectors M and N. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their internationally
mobile capabilities in sector M, while in sector N, the source of heterogeneity is
the immobile capabilities that firms own.97 NY suggest that the motivation of a
firm engaging in a cross-border merger is closely linked to a firm’s heterogeneous
capabilities. So, a target or an acquiring firm’s main motivation for undertaking
cross-border merger is to exploit complementarities when combining the firm-specific
capabilities.98 Considering different possibilities regarding the nature of acquirers’
firm-specific assets and targets’ assets: NY confirm the standard findings of the
literature on FDI, suggesting that firms engaging in greenfield investment are more
efficient than exporters. Moreover, when they consider the sector where firms differ
in terms of their internationally mobile capabilities only (sector M), they show that
the more productive firms prefer cross-border merger over greenfield FDI.99
NY claim that their findings are in connection with “superstar” phenomenon pro-
posed by Rosen (1981). More precisely, NY suggest that the best mobile capabilities,
i.e. the most advanced technology, are allocated to cross-border merger, since those
capabilities are the superstars in an industry. For this reason, NY conclude that
foreign firms with the best technology prefer to combine their assets via cross-border
merger with a home target firm which has knowledge of local market conditions.
97While the production technology of a firm is considered as an example of mobile capabilities,
local marketing experience or supply networks are associated with immobile capabilities.
98Greenfield investment, on the other hand, can be considered as a more direct way for a firm to
utilize its own firm-specific assets.
99However, they find that firms that engage in cross-border merger are the least efficient in
industry N where firms differ in terms of internationally non-mobile capabilities.
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As we described in the paragraph above, unlike our paper, NY consider that the
efficiency motive is the only motive for a merger, since they consider monopolistic
competition. In this chapter, we introduce the competition reducing effect of merger
by considering a duopolistic competition framework.100 Unlike NY, we show that a
decrease in productivity may increase incentives for cross-border merger, while an
increase in productivity may increase incentives for greenfield FDI. These results
might be interpereted as follows: In our framework, more productive firm may pre-
fer greenfiled FDI in order to access home country market, since it might eleminate
less productive firms in home market and obtain monopoly power. On the other
hand, a relatively less productive firm may prefer cross-border merger to greenfield
FDI in order to enjoy market concantration effect of merger. In such case, merged
entity will adopt the technology of the more productive firm and produce with better
technology. By doing this, it aims to behave as a monopolist in the market.101
In the following section, we describe our model where we consider both strategic
and efficiency motives for cross-border merger; and we show that the predictions
of NY do not necessarily hold when the competition-reducing effect of merger is
considered.
4.3. The Model
Consider an economy with two countries: home (H) and foreign (F), and two rival
firms, each already settled in one of these countries. Assume that Firm F is located
in the foreign country, while Firm H is located in the home country.102 We assume
100We also consider a case where there are N firms in the home country (N > 2). So, in addition
to strategic motive, we also consider the efficiency motive of merger arising from technology transfer
when firms merge.
101In such case, cross-border merger might create a similar effect in terms of cost advantage as if
the merged firm had undertaken a drastic innovation.
102We show in Section 4.5 that our qualitative results also hold when we consider that there are
N number of firms located in the home country, where N > 2.
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that these firms produce differentiated products and compete in the home-country
market:
Export (X): Firm F serves the H market through export by incurring a positive
per-unit transportation cost t.
Greenfield FDI (G) : Firm F undertakes greenfield FDI by incurring a setup cost,
G.
Cross-border Mergers (M): Firm F and firm H merge and the merger activity
involves a fixed cost of K.
Although Firm F has another option, i.e. not serving the home-country market,
we will assume the parameters values in a way so that this option will not occur
in equilibrium. We will do this because considering the option of not serving the
home-country by Firm F will not add much new insights to our analysis.
We consider that labour is the only factor of production (as in NY), and the wage
rates in both countries are the same and equal to w. Firms differ in terms of their
labour productivities, and the technology of Firms F and H are qF = LF/l, and
qH = LH , respectively, where l is the inverse of labour productivity. Lower l implies
higher labour productivity in this context, and this implies that Firm F is more pro-
ductive than Firm H.103 We finally assume that Firm F can transfer its technological
advantage to the merged entity so that it can produce at the same marginal cost it
faces in its home country. This assumption makes our results comparable to findings
provided by NY for Sector M in their paper, where firms are heterogeneous in terms
of their internationally mobile capabilities.
Following Bowley (1924), we assume that the representative consumer in country
H has the following utility function:104
103Hence we obtain labour demand for Firm F and H: LF =  qF and LH = qH
104The Bowley type of market demand function is commonly used in the industrial organization
literature.
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UH = (qF + qH) 
✓
q2F
2
+
q2H
2
◆
   qF qH +m
where m stands for the numeraire commodity, and the parameter   2 (0, 1) is the
degree of product differentiation. The resulting inverse demand function for goods
qF and qH are:
pH = 1  qH   gqF
where pH is price, qF , qH are outputs. The products are perfect substitutes if
  = 1, while the goods are isolated for   = 0. We avoid these two extreme cases in
our analysis, and assume that   2 (0, 1).
We consider the following two-stage game. At stage 1, Firm F determines whether
to export or to undertake greenfield FDI or to merge with Firm H. At stage 2,
firms compete in the home market if Firm F either exports or undertakes greenfield
FDI. There is no competition if Firms F and H merge. We will consider Cournot
competiton in the next section and will consider Bertrand competition in Section
4.5.1. It may worth mentioning that if Firms F and H merge, the merged firm
becomes a monopolist with two differentiated products. The profits are realized
according to Firm F’s production decision. We solve the game through backward
induction.
4.4. Equilibrium Analysis
4.4.1. Export vs. Greenfield FDI
Firstly, we consider that the foreign firm chooses between export and greenfield
investment in order to access the host country’s market.
If Firm F chooses to export, it determines output by maximizing the following
expression:
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Max
qF
(1  qF    qH    w   t)qF (4.1)
Expression (4.1) shows that Firm F can sell qF units of product with a trans-
portation cost of tqF , while the production cost is equal to lwqF . Firm H determines
its output to maximize the following expression:
Max
qH
(1  qH    qF   w)qH (4.2)
Maximizing (4.1) and (4.2) provides us with the equilibrium outputs of Firms F
and H. Let qXF and qXH are equilibrium outputs:
qXF =
(2   w(2   ) 2t)
(4  2) , and q
X
H =
(2 g w(2 lg)+gt)
(4 g2)
Let pXF (pXH) represent Firm F’s (Firm H’s) operating profit if Firm F chooses to
export. Then the profits of Firms F and H are:
pXF =
(2   w(2   ) 2t)2
(4  2)2 (4.3)
pXH =
(2 g w(2 lg)+gt)2
(4 g2)2 (4.4)
We assume that qXF and qXH are positive, i.e. t <
(2 2 w  +w )
2 ⌘ t
In contrast, if Firm F undertakes greenfield investment, it maximizes the following
profit function:
Max
qF
(1  qF    qH    w)qF  G (4.5)
while the profit function for Firm H is:
Max
qH
(1  qH    qF   w)qH (4.6)
Maximizing (4.5) and (4.6), we obtain the equilibrium outputs of Firms F and H
under greenfield investment are (qGF and qGH ):
qGF =
(2   w(2   ))
(4  2) ; and q
G
H =
(2   w(2   ))
(4  2)
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Let pGF (pGH) represent Firm F’s (Firm H’s) profit if Firm F chooses to undertake
greenfield FDI. Then the profits of Firms F and H are:
pGF =
(2   w(2   ))2
(4  2)2  G (4.7)
pGH =
(2 g w(2 lg))2
(4  2)2 (4.8)
We assume that qGF , qGH are positive, i.e. w <
(2  )
2    ⌘ w.
Firm F prefers greenfield FDI compared to export if and only if pGF > pXF or:
G <
⇣
 4t( 2+t+2 w+  w )( 4+ 2)2
⌘
⌘ G1 (4.9)
where G1 > 0. Firm F prefers export over greenfield FDI if and only if G > G1.
Differentiating G1 with respect to l we find that @G1@l =   8tw( 4+g2)2 < 0. The following
result summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1: If greenfield FDI is available as an alternative to exporting, i.e.
G < G1, Firm F’s incentive to pursue greenfield investment increases in its produc-
tivity.
The above finding indicates that if Firm F becomes more productive, i.e. lower
l, its incentive to pursue greenfield investment increases, i.e. G1 increases. The
reason behind this is the fact that when the productivity of Firm F increases, it
produces more, and faces a higher trade cost in total. Since this cost can be avoided
by greenfield FDI, Firm F’s incentive to pursue greenfield FDI increases. This result
is in line with findings of the recent literature on FDI that we mentioned in the
previous section (for instance Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)).
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4.4.2. Export vs. Cross-Border Merger
From equation (4.9) we know that Firm F prefers greenfield investment if and
only if G < G1, otherwise it prefers to export. In this sub-section, we assume that
G > G1, in other words, Firm F prefers export compared to greenfield FDI. Now,
we will see Firm F’s preference for cross-border merger with Firm H compared to
export when G > G1.
We know from (4.3) and (4.4) that if Firm F chooses to export, the profits of
Firms F and H are:
pXF =
(2   w(2   ) 2t)2
(4  2)2 , and p
X
H =
((2   w(2   )+t )2
(4  2)2
On the other hand, if Firms F and H merge, the merged entity maximizes the
following profit function:
Max
qF ,qH
(1  qF    qH   lw)qF + (1  qH    qF    w)qH  K (4.10)
The merged firm produces differentiated products in the home country. Firm
F avoids the trade cost via cross-border merger, there is a cost of merger, K. In
equation (4.10) l stands for the productivity of the merged firm. Since we assume
that Firm F is more efficient than Firm H, the merged firm uses the technology of
Firm F after the merger.
If Firms F and H merge, the equilibrium output and the profit of merged firm
are:
qMF = qMH =
(1  w)
2(1+ ) , and
pMF+H =
(1  w)2
2(1+g)  K (4.11)
The merger between firms F and H occurs if the profit of merged entity pMF+H ,
exceeds the total profits of Firms F and H under export by Firm F, i.e. if:
pMF+H > p
X
F + p
X
H
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while pXF and pXH denote the profits of Firms F and H under export by Firm
F. It follows from (4.3), (4.4) and (4.11), that Firm F prefers cross-border merger
compared to export if and only if:
K < (1  w)
2
2(1+ )  
⇣
(2 g w(2   ) 2t)2
(4  2)2 +
(2   w(2   )+t )2
(4  2)2
⌘
⌘ K1 (4.12)
Condition (4.12) tells us that Firm F prefers a cross-border merger over export
if the cost of merger, K, is less than K1. This shows the maximum gain of Firm F
from merger compared to export, thus a higher value of K1 suggests that the Firm
F has a higher incentive to pursue a cross-border merger.
Now we show how the incentive for merger changes with respect to productivity.
In order to examine this we rearrange the derivative ofK1 with respect to l. Equation
(4.12) shows thatK1 consists of the profit of the merged entity, and the profits of Firm
F and H when Firm F chooses to export. All these profits in equation (4.12) depend
on productivity term  . Therefore, the relationship between K1 and   depends
on how these three profit terms react to a productivity change. If the difference
between the profit of the merged firm and the combined profit of Firms F and H
under export by Firm F increases (decreases) in  , we can conclude that a lower
productivity increases (decreases) Firm F’s merger incentive. Before examining this,
we define:
t⇤ = 8w (1+ ) ( 2+ )
2(2+ ( +2))+ w(8+ ( 8+ ( 10+ ( 2+ )))
2(1+ )(4+ 2)
where t⇤ > 0 if w > (g 2)
2(2+g(g+2))
8g(1+g)+l(8+g( 8+g( 10+g( 2+g))) ⌘ w⇤, and w⇤ > 0.
Proposition 2: If export is Firm F’s preferred choice as an alternative to merger,
(G > G1), a higher productivity of Firm F increases (reduces) the incentive for
cross-border merger if t 2 (t⇤, t) or if (t 2 (0, t⇤)).
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Proof: By using condition (4.12) we can show that @K1@l < (>) 0 for t > (<) t
⇤,
where t⇤ < t. ⌅ ‌
The above result is in contrast to Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for t < t⇤ who shows
that the most efficient firm chooses cross-border merger. The intuition behind this
finding is that a decrease in the productivity of Firm F causes an increase in Firm
H’s profit, while the profit of Firm F decreases. If the trade cost is below a certain
threshold (t < t⇤), thus creating a higher competition in the home-country market,
the decrease in profit of Firm F outweighs the increase in profit of Firm H, and the
total profit of these two firms, given by the total value inside parenthesis in equation
(4.12), decreases. This leads to an increase in K1.
The proposition above shows that the per-unit trade cost, t, plays a crucial role
in obtaining this result. The level of trade cost is important, because it determines
the intensity of competition between the firms, which affects the outputs and the
profits of the firms under export by Firm F.
Another driving force of the level of competition in our model is the level of prod-
uct differentiation, g. In order to see the effect of the level of product differentiation
on our findings, we consider how the value of t⇤ changes with respect to the level of
g.
Proposition 3: A lower level of product differentiation, i.e. higher g, increase the
range for t, which ensures that Proposition 2 holds true where t < t⇤.
Proof: Differentiating t⇤ with respect to g, we find that:
‌@t⇤@g =
( 4+g2)( 8 g(8+g(16+g(2+g)))+w( 8(1+g)2+ (16+g(24+g(24+g(2+g)))))
2(1+ )2(4+ 2)2 > 0 ⌅ ‌
The above result implies that as product differentiation reduces, the finding pro-
posed in Proposition 2 for t < t⇤ is more likely to hold true. The reason behind this
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is because competition effect increases, as product differentiation reduces. Thus the
condition of t < t⇤ can be satisfied for a higher t.
4.4.3. Greenfield FDI vs Cross-Border Merger
In this sub-section, we consider that G < G1, i.e. Firm F prefers greenfield FDI
compared to export.
We know from equations (4.7), and (4.8) that if Firm F undertakes greenfield
FDI, the profits of firms Firms F and H are:
pGF =
(2   w(2   ))2
(4  2)2  G, and pGH = ((2 g w(2 lg))
2
(4  2)2
If Firms F and H merge, we know from (4.11) that the profit of the merged entity
is:
pMF+H =
(1  w)2
2(1+ )  K
‌If greenfield FDI is the alternative to merger, a merger between firms F and H is
profitable if:
pMF+H > p
G
F + p
G
H
where pMF+H denotes the post-merger profit of the merged entity, while pGF and
pGH denote the profit of Firms F and H under greenfield FDI by Firm F. Hence, the
cross-border merger occurs if and only if:
K < (1  w)
2
2(1+ )  
⇣
(2 g w(2   ))2
(4  2)2 +
((2   w(2   ))2
(4  2)2  G
⌘
⌘ K2 (4.13)
Condition (4.13) tells us that Firm F prefers to do cross-border merger over
greenfield FDI if the cost of merger, K, is less than K2, which shows the maximum
gain of Firm F from merger compared to greenfield FDI. A higher value for K2
suggests that Firm F has a higher incentive for cross-border merger.
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Before further analysis we define:
w
0
= (  2)
2(2+ (2+ ))
8g(1+g)+ (8+g( 8+g( 10+g( 2+g)) > 0.
Proposition 4: If greenfield FDI is Firm F’s preferred choice as an alternative
to merger, i.e. G < G1, Firm F’s incentive for undertaking cross-border merger
increases (reduces) with lower l, i.e higher productivity, if w 2 (0, w0) or if (w 2
(w
0
, w)).
Proof: The proof follows from rearranging the derivative of K2 with respect to  .
Straightforward calculation shows that @K2@l < (>) 0 for w < (>) w
0. The rest of the
proof follows immediately.105 ⌅ ‌
Again, this result is in contrast to Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for w > w0 . The
proposition above suggests that when wages are below a certain threshold, the foreign
firm’s incentive to undertake cross-border merger increases with higher productivity.
On the other hand, if wages are sufficiently high, (bigger than w0), higher productivity
reduces the foreign firm’s incentive to undertake cross-border merger. This can be
explained as follows. It is a straightforward result of equation (4.13) that an increase
in the productivity of the foreign firm causes a decrease in the domestic firm’s profit,
while the profit of foreign firm increases. Similarly, in the case of merger, higher
productivity results in a higher profit. When wages are high (above w0), the cost
advantage of the foreign firm over the home country firm is relatively higher than it is
when wages are low (below w0). For this reason, when wages are high, a productivity
increase causes a more dramatic profit increase for the foreign firm than it would
when wages are low. This increase is higher than the increase in the profit of the
merged firm when wages are high. This explains why cross-border merger becomes
less attractive as the productivity of the foreign firm increases when wages are high.
105Please see Appendix 3 Section C.1 for the proof of w > w
0
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Now we show how the range of w over which a higher productivity reduces the
incentive for a cross-border merger varies with product differentiation.
Proposition 5: A lower level of product differentiation, i.e. higher g, increases w0,
i.e. increases the range of w over which a higher productivity reduces the incentive
for a cross-border merger.
Proof: The proof is documented in Appendix 3 Section C.2 ‌
The proposition above suggests that lower level of product differentiation (higher
g) increase the range of w suggesting that lower productivity is associated with higher
incentive for cross-border merger. The intuition is similar to that of Proposition 3.
4.5. Robustness and Extentions
4.5.1. Bertrand Competition
As Salant et al. (1983), and Deneckere and Davidson (1995) show, Bertrand
and Cournot models sometimes provide different findings when it comes to merger
analysis.106 Thus, in this section we will consider Bertrand competition by assuming
that firms compete by setting prices rather than quantities. In order to solve the
Bertrand game, first we obtain the direct demand functions by utilizing the inverse
demand functions. They take the following form:
qF =
(1 g) PF+ PH
1 g2 , and qH =
(1 g) PH+gPF
1 g2
For our analysis under Bertrand competition, we illustrate the calculations for
equilibrium outputs and profits in Appendix 3 Section A.
106Salant et.al (1983) show the merger paradox under Cournot competition, unless all firms that
merge create a monopoly. On the other hand, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that mergers can
be profitable for both insiders and outsiders in a model of Bertrand competition with differentiated
products, i.e. the merger paradox does not hold.
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4.5.1.1. Equilibrium Analysis
Export vs Greenfield FDI
Consider that the foreign firm chooses between export and greenfield investment
in order to access the home country’s market. If Firm F chooses to export, qXF and
qXH are equilibrium outputs, and positive if t <1    w   (w 1)  2 2 ⌘ t. However, if
Firm F undertaked greenfield FDI, qGF and qGH are equilibrium outputs, and they are
positive if w < (  1)(2+ ) + ( 2+ 2) ⌘ w. We assume that these conditions hold.
Firm F chooses to undertake greenfield FDI if and only if pGF > pXF or:
G
0
<
⇣
t( 2+g2)( 2( 2+t+2 w)+2( 1+w) +g2( 2+t+2lw))
( 4+ 2)2( 1+g2)
⌘
⌘ G2 (4.14)
Export vs. Cross-Border Merger
From equation (4.14) we know that Firm F prefers greenfield FDI compared to
export if and only if G0 < G2; otherwise it prefers to export over greenfield FDI. If
G
0
> G2, i.e. export is Firm F’s available strategy as an alternative to merger, we
find that cross-border merger is profitable compared to export if and only if:
K
0
< ( 1+lw)
2
2(1+g)   [(  (2( 1+t+lw)+g wg ( 1+t+lw)g
2)2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) )
+(  (2+g( 1+t g)+w( 2+g(l+g)))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) )] ⌘ K3
(4.15)
Let’s define:
t⇤⇤ =  8+8(1+w) +2 
2 4(1+w) 3+ 4+ 5  w( 8+ (16+ (2+ ( 8+ + 2)
2(4 3 2+g4) .
where, t⇤⇤ > 0 if w > (  1)(g+2)
2(2+( 2+ ) )
4g(-2+ 2)+l( 8+g(16+g(2+g( 8+g+g2)))) ⌘ w⇤⇤ > 0
Proposition 6: If export is Firm F’s preferred choice as an alternative to merger,
(G
0
> G2), a higher productivity of Firm F increases (reduces) the incentive for
cross-border merger, if t 2 (t⇤⇤, t) or if (t 2 (0, t⇤⇤).
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Proof : By using condition (4.15) we can show that @K3@l < (>) 0 for t > (<) t
⇤⇤,
where t⇤⇤ < t. ⌅ ‌
Like the case under Cournot competition, this result is in contrast to NY for
t < t⇤⇤. The intuition is similar to that of Proposition 2.
Greenfield FDI vs Cross-Border Merger
Consider in this sub-section that G0 < G2, i.e. greenfield FDI is preferable in
the absence of merger. We find that cross-border merger is profitable compared to
greenfield FDI by Firm F if and only if:
K
00
< ( 1+lw)
2
2(1+g)   (  (2+ ( 1+w g)+lg( 2+g
2))2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)  G
0
+
(  ( 2+g+g2 w( 2+g(l+g)))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) )) ⌘ K4
(4.16)
Condition (4.16) tells us that Firm F prefers to do cross-border merger over
greenfield FDI if and only if K 00 < K4.
Let’s define:
w
00
=  8+8 +2 
2 4 3+ 4+ 5
 8l 8g+16lg+2l 2+4g3 8l 3+lg4+lg5 > 0.
Proposition 7: If greenfield FDI is Firm F’s preferred choice as an alternative to
merger, (G0 < G2), Firm F’s incentive for undertaking cross-border merger increases
(reduces) with higher productivity, if w 2 (0, w00) or if (w 2 (w00 , w)).
Proof : By using condition (4.16) we can show that @K4@l < (>)0 for w < (>)w
00.
The intuition is similar to that of for Proposition 4.
4.5.2. N Firms in the Home Country
To convey our point in the simplest way, we assumed in section 2 that there is only
one firm in the home country. We show in this section that our findings of section
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2 hold true when there are n symmetric firms in the home-country, where n > 2.
When we rearrange the inverse demand functions for the case of N firms, the resulting
inverse demand function for Firm F and for the ith home-firm are respectively:
pF = 1  qF  
nX
i=1
qi
pi = 1 
nX
i=1
qi   qF
where pF , and pi are prices, qF , qi are outputs.
We assume in this section that the firms compete like Cournot oligopolists. We
illustrate the calculations for equilibrium outputs and profits in Appendix 3 Section
B.
Equilibrium Analysis
Export vs Greenfield FDI
First, consider Firm F’s choice between export and greenfield FDI.
If Firm F chooses to export, qXF and qXH are equilibrium outputs, and positive if
t < 1  w+nw  nw(1+n) ⌘ t. On the other hand, if Firm F chooses to undertake greenfield
FDI, qGF and qGH are equilibrium outputs, positive if w < 1(2+ ) ⌘ w. We assume that
these conditions hold.
Firm F prefers greenfield FDI over export if and only if:
G
00
<
⇣
  (1+n)t( 2+t+nt+2( +( 1+ )n)w)(n+2)2
⌘
⌘ G3 (4.17)
If condition (4.17) is not satisfied, Firm F prefers export to greenfield FDI.
120
Export vs. Cross-Border Merger
On the other hand, we find that cross-border merger is profitable compared to
export by Firm F if and only if:
K
00
< (1 lnw+w(n 1))
2
(n+1)2  
⇣
(1 lw(n+1) t(n+1)+wn)2
(n+2)2 +
(1 2w+ w+t)2
(2+n)2
⌘
⌘ K5 (4.18)
A cross-border merger between Firm F and the ith firm in the home country is
not preferable over export if the cost of merger, K 00, is greater than K5, showing the
maximum gain from merger compared to export.
Let’s define:
t⇤⇤⇤ =  n(3+2n)+(2+n(9+5n) l(2+3n(2+n)))w(1+n)2(2+n(2+n))
‌
Moreover, t⇤⇤⇤ > 0 if w > n(3+2n) 2+2  9n+6 n 5n2+3 n2 ⌘ w⇤⇤⇤, where w⇤⇤⇤ > 0
Proposition 8: If export is Firm F’s preferred choice as an alternative to merger,
(G
00
> G3), Firm F’s higher productivity increases (reduces) the incentive for cross-
border merger, if t 2 (t⇤⇤⇤, t) or if (t 2 (0, t⇤⇤⇤).
Proof: By using condition (4.18) we can show that @K5@l < (>) 0 for t > (<) t
⇤⇤⇤,
where t⇤⇤⇤ < t. ⌅
This result is in contrast to Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for t < t⇤⇤⇤.
Greenfield FDI vs Cross-Border Merger
We consider in this subsection that G00 < G3, i.e. greenfield FDI is Firm F’s
preferred choice as an alternative to merger. Firm F undertakes cross-border merger
compared to greenfield FDI if and only if:
K
00
< (1 lnw+w(n 1)
2
(n+1)2  
⇣
(1 lw(n+1)+wn)2
(n+2)2 +
(1 2w+lw)2
(n+2)2  G
00
⌘
⌘ K6 (4.19)
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Condition (4.19) tells us that Firm F prefers cross-border merger over greenfield
investment if the cost of merger, K 00 , is less than K6. This shows the maximum gain
of Firm F from merger compared to greenfield investment. A higher value for K6
suggests that Firm F has a higher incentive for cross-border merger.
Let’s define:
w
000
=  3n 2n
2
 2+2  9n+6 n 5n2+3 n2 .
Proposition 9: If greenfield FDI is Firm F’s preferred choice as an alternative to
merger, (G00 < G3), Firm F’s incentive for undertaking cross-border merger increases
(reduces) with its higher productivity if w 2 (0, w000) or if (w 2 (w000 , w)).
Proof: The proof follows from rearranging the derivative of K6 with respect to  .
A straightforward calculation shows that @K6@l < (>) 0 for w < (>) w
000. The rest of
the proof follows immediately. ⌅ ‌
Again, this result is in contrast to Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for w > w000 .
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4.6. Conclusion and Future Research Agenda
In this chapter, we showed how the productivity of a foreign firm affects the in-
centive for a cross-border merger. In a two-country oligopolistic model with differen-
tiated goods, we showed that the predictions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007), suggesting
that the most productive firms prefer cross-border merger, may not hold true if the
competition reducing effect of a merger is considered. We observed a non-monotonic
relationship between productivity and a cross-border merger, and showed that our
results hold under both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Interesting results in terms of welfare implications can be obtained from our
framework. We showed in Appendix 3 Section D that if a less productive foreign firm
chooses between export and cross-border merger, then the home country government
may allow for merger. Although cross-border merger creates market-concentration
effects, which have a negative effect on consumer surplus, the home country govern-
ment may allow merger since the foreign firm avoids the trade cost (t) via merger,
which has a positive effect on consumer surplus. We found that, for a given w,   and
 , the home country welfare gain is higher under cross-border merger than under
exporting by the foreign firm. On the other hand, we considered another scenario
where the foreign firm experiences a productivity improvement, and chooses between
greenfield FDI and cross-border mergers. Clearly, in such a case, the home country’s
government does not allow the merger, since it does not create any welfare benefit,
and it causes market concentration.
In order to focus on the strategic motive for merger, we kept our model simple by
assuming that there is only one foreign firm. However, it would be interesting to in-
vestigate a model where there are two or more asymmetric (in terms of productivity)
foreign firms, to examine the strategy of different foreign firms, where competition
among the foreign firms for greenfield FDI and cross-border merger creates further
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strategic effects. We leave this issue for future research.
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Appendix 3 Section A:
Bertrand Competition and The International Organization of
Production
Equilibrium Analysis
Export vs Greenfield FDI
First, consider firm F’s choice between export and greenfield FDI. If Firm F
chooses to export, the objective functions for Firms F and H are pXF = (PF  w t)qF
and pXH = (PH w)qH respectively. The resulting equilibrium prices, and profits are:
PXF =  2  +2 w+ w+2t  
2
 4+ 2 , and
pXF =   (2( 1+t+ w)+  w  ( 1+t+ w) 
2)2
( 4+ 2)2( 1+g2) (A3.1)
PXH =  2 g+2w+lgw+t  g
2
 4+g2 , and
pXH =   (2+ ( 1+t  )+w( 2+ (l+g)))
2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) (A3.2)
If Firm F undertakes greenfield FDI, the objective functions for firms F and H are
pGF = (PF  w)qF G0 and pXH = (PH w)qH respectively. The resulting equilibrium
prices, and profits are:
PGF =  2  +2 w+ w  
2
 4+ 2 , and
pGF =   (2+( 1+w  ) +  ( 2+ 
2))2
( 4+ 2)2( 1+g2)  G
0 (A3.3)
PGH =  2 g+2w+lgw g
2
 4+g2 , and
pGH =   ( 2+ +g
2 w( 2+ (l+g)))2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) (A3.4)
Firm F undertakes greenfield FDI if and only if pGF > pXF or:
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  (2+( 1+w g)g+lg( 2+g2))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)  G
0
>   (2( 1+t+lw)+g wg ( 1+t+lw)g2)2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)
which can be shown as follows:
G
0
<
⇣
t( 2+g2)( 2( 2+t+2 w)+2( 1+w) +g2( 2+t+2lw))
( 4+ 2)2( 1+g2)
⌘
⌘ G2 (A3.5)
Export vs. Cross-Border Merger
From equation (A3.5) we know that Firm F prefers greenfield FDI if and only if
G
0
< G2, otherwise it prefers to export.
Let’s assume that G0 > G2, in other words, export is Firm F’s preferred choice as
an alternative to merger. We know from (A3.1) and (A3.2) that if Firm F exports,
the equilibrium profits of Firms F and H are:
pXF =   (2( 1+t+ w)+  w  ( 1+t+ w) 
2)2
( 4+ 2)2( 1+g2) , and p
X
H =   (2+ ( 1+t  )+w( 2+ (l+g)))
2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)
On the other hand, if Firms F and H merge, the merged firm maximize the
following expression:
pMF+H =(PF   lw)qF + (PH   lw)qH  K 0
The merged firm produces both the products, and the equilibrium prices and the
profit of merged firm are:
PMF = P
M
H =
(1+ w)
2 ,
and pMF+H =
( 1+ w)2
2(1+g)  K
0 (A3.6)
Cross-border merger is profitable compared to export by Firm F if:
pMF+H > p
X
F + p
X
H
where pMF+G denotes the profit of the merged firm, while pXF and pXH denote the
profit of Firms F and H under export by Firm F.
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Following (A3.1), (A3.2) and (A3.6), we get that cross-border merger if preferable
to export by Firm F if and only if:
( 1+lw)2
2(1+g)  K
0
> (  (2( 1+t+lw)+g wg ( 1+t+lw)g2)2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) +
(  (2+( 1+t g)g+w( 2+g(l+g)))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) ))
or
K
0
< ( 1+lw)
2
2(1+g)   (  (2( 1+t+lw)+g wg ( 1+t+lw)g
2)2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)
  (2+( 1+t g)g+w( 2+g(l+g)))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) ) ⌘ K3
Greenfield FDI vs. Cross-Border Merger
Now consider the case of G0 < G2, i.e. greenfield FDI is Firm F’s preferred choice
as an alternative to merger. We know from (A3.3) and (A3.4) that when Firm F
undertakes greenfield FDI, the profits of firm F and H are:
pGF =   (2+ ( 1+w  )+  ( 2+ 
2))2
( 4+ 2)2( 1+g2)  G
0 , and pGH =   ( 2+ +g
2 w( 2+ (l+g)))2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)
However, if Firms F and H merge, we know from (A6) that:
pMF+H =
( 1+ w)2
2(1+g)  K
00
A cross-border merger between Firms F and H is profitable compared to greenfield
FDI by Firm F if:
pMF+H > p
G
F + p
G
H
where pMF+G denotes the profit of the merged firm, while pGF and pGH denote the
profits of Firms F and H under greenfield FDI by Firm F. Following (A3.3), (A3.4)
and (A3.6), we get that cross-border merger is profitable than greenfield FDI by
Firm F if and only if:
( 1+lw)2
2(1+g)  M
00
> (  (2+( 1+w g)g+lg( 2+g2))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)  G
0
+
(  ( 2+g+g2 w( 2+g(l+g)))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) ))
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or
K
00
< ( 1+lw)
2
2(1+g)   (  (2+( 1+w g)g+lg( 2+g
2))2
( 4+g2)2( 1+g2)  G
0
+
(  ( 2+g+g2 w( 2+g(l+g)))2( 4+g2)2( 1+g2) )) ⌘ K4
Appendix 3 Section B:
N Firms in the Home Country
To show our results in the simplest way, we assumed in section 2 that there is only
one firm in the home country. We show in this section that our results in section 2
hold true even if there are n symmetric firms in the home country, where n > 2. If
there are n home-country firms, the resulting inverse demand functions are:
pF = 1  qF  
nX
i=1
qi
pi = 1 
nX
i=1
qi   qF
where pF , and pi are prices, qF , qi are outputs.
Equilibrium Analysis
Export vs Greenfield FDI
First, consider the foreign firm’s choice between export and greenfield FDI. If
Firm F exports, it determines output by maximizing the following expression:
Max
qF
(1  qF  
nX
i=1
qi    w   t)qF
while profit maximization problem of ith firm in home country is:
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Max
qi
(1 
nX
i=1
qi   qF   w)qi
The resulting equilibrium outputs and profits are:
qXF =
(1 lw(n+1) t(n+1))+wn)
(n+2) , and
pXF =
(1 lw(n+1) t(n+1))+wn)2
(n+2)2 (A3.7)
and output and profit of the ith home-country firm are:
qXi =
(1 2w+ w+t)
(2+n) , and
pXi =
(1 2w+lw+t)2
(2+n)2 (A3.8)
If firm F undertakes greenfield FDI, it maximizes the following profit function
Max
qF
(1  qF  
Pn
i=1 qi   lw)qF  G
while the profit maximization problem of the ith home-country firm is:
Max
qi
(1 Pni=1 qi   qF   w)qi
The resulting equilibrium outputs and profits are:
qGF =
(1 lw(n+1)+wn)
(n+2) and
pGF =
(1 lw(n+1)+wn)2
(n+2)2  G (A3.9)
and output and profit of the ith home-country firm are
qGi =
(1 2w+lw)
(n+2) and
pGi =
(1 2w+lw)2
(n+2)2 (A3.10)
So, Firm F prefers greenfield FDI compared to export if pGF > pEF or:
(1   w(n+ 1) + wn)2
(n+ 2)2
 G00 > (1   w(n+ 1)  t(n+ 1)) + wn)
2
(n+ 2)2
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which can be shown as follows:
G
00
<
⇣
  (1+n)t( 2+t+nt+2( +( 1+ )n)w)(n+2)2
⌘
⌘ G3 (A3.11)
Export vs. Cross-Border Merger
From (A3.11) we know that Firm F prefers greenfield FDI if and only if G00 < G3,
otherwise it prefers to export.
Let’s assume that G00 > G3, i.e. export is Firm F’s available strategy as an
alternative to merger.
We know from (A3.7) and (A3.8) that when Firm F chooses to export, the profits
of Firm F and the ith home-country firm are:
pXF =
(1 lw(n+1) t(n+1))+wn)2
(n+2)2 , and p
X
i =
(1 2w+ w+t)2
(2+n)2
However, if Firm F and the ith home-country firm merge, the merged firm deter-
mines output to maximize the following profit function:
Max
qM
(1  qM  
n 1X
j=1
qj   lw)qM  K 00
and each of the remaining home-country firm, say, firm j, determines output to
maximize the following expression:
Max
qi
(1 
n 1X
j=1
qj   qM   w)qi
If Firms F and the ith home-country firm merge, the equilibrium output and the
profit of merged firm are:
qMM =
(1  nw+w(n 1)
(n+1) , and
pMM =
(1 lnw+w(n 1)2
(n+1)2  K
00 (A3.12)
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A merger between Firms F and the ith home-country firm is preferable compared
to export by Firm F if
pMM > p
X
F + p
X
i
Following (A3.7), (A3.8) and (A3.12), we get that merger occurs if and only if:
(1  lnw + w(n  1))2
(n+ 1)2
 M 00 > (1  lw(n+ 1)  t(n+ 1)) + wn)
2
(n+ 2)2
+
(1  2w +  w + t)2
(2 + n)2
which can be shown as follows:
K
00
< (1 lnw+w(n 1)
2
(n+1)2  
⇣
(1 lw(n+1) t(n+1))+wn)2
(n+2)2 +
(1 2w+ w+t)2
(2+n)2
⌘
⌘ K5 (A3.13)
Greenfield FDI vs Cross-Border Merger
In this sub-section, we consider that G00 < G3, i.e. greenfield FDI is Firm F’s
available strategy as an alternative to merger.
We know from equations (A3.9) and (A3.10) that if Firm F undertakes greenfield
FDI, the profits of firms Firm F and the ith home-country firm are:
pGF =
(1 lw(n+1)+wn)2
(n+2)2  G and pGi = (1 2w+lw)
2
(n+2)2
If Firm F and the ith firm merge, we know from (A3.12) that the profit of the
merged firm is:
pMM =
(1 lnw+w(n 1)2
(n+1)2  K
00
‌A merger between Firm F and the ith home-country firm is profitable compared
to greenfield FDI by Firm F if:
pMM > p
G
F + p
G
i or
K
00
< (1 lnw+w(n 1))
2
(n+1)2  
⇣
(1 lw(n+1)+wn)2
(n+2)2 +
(1 2w+lw)2
(n+2)2  G
000
⌘
⌘ K6 (A3.14)
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Appendix 3 Section C:
Section C.1: Proof of w   w0 > 0
w   w0 =
⇣
(g  2)
⇣
1
   2 +
4+2g  3
8 (1+ )+ (8+ ( 8+ ( 10+(  2) )))
⌘⌘
w   w0 > 0 if  ✏[0, 1] and  ✏(.732, 1] (see Figure 4.1 below)
Section C.2: Proof of Proposition 5
@(w   w0 )
@g =
266664
1
   2 +
4+2g  3
8 (1+ )+ (8+ ( 8+ ( 10+(  2) )))+
(g  2)
⇣
  
(   2)2 +
2(1+2 )( 4 2g+ 3)(4+ ( 4 2g+ 2))
(8 (1+ )+ (8 8  10 2 2 3+ 4))2
⌘
+(g  2)( 2 3 28 (1+ )+ (8+ ( 8+ ( 10+(  2) ))))
377775
Plotting the above expression for  ✏(0, 1) and  ✏(0, 1) completes the proof:
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Appendix 3 Section D:
If the foreign firm, Firm F, chooses between export and cross-border merger:
maxWM = pMF+H   pXF + 12
⇣
(qMF+H)2 + (q
M
F+H)
2 + 2 (qMF+H + qMF+H)
⌘
and
WX = pXH +
1
2
⇣
(qXH)2 + (q
X
F )
2 + 2 (qXH + qXF )
⌘
where maxWM stands for the maximum possible home country welfare, which
can be obtained when Firms F and H merges, whileWX represents the home country
welfare under Firm F exporting.
Home country’s welfare gain ( W ) if it allows merger can be calculated as:
DWX = maxWM  WX
DWX =
1
4
0B@  4K + ( 1+ w)2+( 1+ w)2 (1+ )2 + 2( 1+ w)2(1+ )   4( 2+2t+2 w+   w)2( 4+ 2)2
+2(4 2t+t
2 6w 2 w+2 wt+3w2+L2w2 2( 1+w)( 1+t+Lw) )
( 4+ 2)2
1CA
We cannot obtain the sign of the above expression. Hence, we will use a numerical
example to show that home country government may allow merger since it provides
higher welfare compared to welfare under foreign firm exporting, i.e. DWX > 0.
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Figure 4.3 illustrates DWX for K = 0.05 = 0.5, w = 0.5,   = 0.8,   = 0.5 and
t 2 (0, 0.5).
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
This thesis consists of three papers examining different aspects of some recent
debates around the productivity-internationalization nexus, where each chapter fo-
cuses on a specific research question. For this reason, we will provide individual
summaries of each chapter.
In Chapter 2, first, we examined the main finding of Melitz (2003) regarding
the relationship between firm level productivity and the firm’s internationalization
decision, where we focused on UK firms for the period between 2003 and 2011.
Namely we tested the self-selection hypothesis. Initially, we used a dataset where
firms from all industries pooled together. We confirmed Melitz’s result when we did
not consider the sunk cost effect (as many empirical studies did in the literature).
However, according to Melitz (2003), the most productive firms self-select themselves
to enter the export market, since only such firms can overcome the sunk cost of
exporting activity. In other words, the sunk cost is expected to have an effect on a
firm’s internationalization decision. Following this, we explicitly controlled for the
sunk cost effect, and showed that the evidence for self-selection vanished. Moreover,
we found that the coefficient of the previous year’s export status (which represents the
sunk cost effect) is positive and significant, which clearly showed that the sunk should
be included in our analysis. As we have already highlighted, the above results were
obtained from a pooled panel dataset. However, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) criticize
this approach, since it avoids all differences between industries. For this reason, we
repeated the analysis above for each industry separately. Eventually, we reported
some findings that are the opposite of those proposed by the self-selection hypothesis.
We showed that in some industries in the UK, such as Non-metal Minerals and Motor
Vehicles/Parts, less productive firms are more likely to export.
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Second, we tested one of the key assumptions of Melitz (2003), the constant
marginal costs assumption. Showing that the average rates of sales growth in do-
mestic and foreign markets are negatively correlated in many industries, such as
Paper/Printing, Coke/Chemicals, and Basic/Fabricated Metals, we concluded that
the constant marginal costs assumption of Melitz (2003) is not valid for these UK
industries. Moreover, we observed that in those industries where firms produce at
increasing marginal cost, the self-selection hypothesis cannot be confirmed.
As we have explained in the introductory chapter, two hypotheses aim to explain
why exporting firms are more productive than non-exporters in the literature on
heterogeneous firms: the self-selection and learning-by exporting hypotheses. We
focused on the self-selection hypothesis in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we tested the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis for UK firms by using the same dataset that we
used in Chapter 2. We started our analysis by showing that some of the UK firms
experience variable returns to scale. Based on this finding, which contradicts any
assumption of CRTS, we computed firm-level TFP by controlling for VRTS. By us-
ing this TFP measure, we estimated the effect of exporting on productivity growth.
Moreover, in order to examine the different channels through which exporting in-
fluences TFP growth, we decomposed TFP growth into its components: technical
change, scale change, and technological progress (efficiency) change. We showed
that the assumption of returns to scale matters when it comes to TFP computation.
More precisely, we provided evidence for an LBE effect when we consider the TFP
measure, which we obtained from a Cobb-Douglas production function. However,
the evidence of LBE vanishes when we considered the TFP measure, which consid-
ers variable returns to scale. We also found that the main source of TFP growth
changes is attributable to a change in scale efficiency. In other words, unlike several
other studies in the literature, we observed that technical improvements -arising from
exporting- do not play any role in productivity growth effects of exporting.
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In Chapters 2 and 3, we considered export as the only way to access foreign
markets, in order to be consistent with Melitz (2003). In Chapter 4, we followed
some recent developments in the literature on trade, and examined the productivity-
internationalization nexus by considering three different options: export, greenfield
FDI, and cross-border merger. We revisited Nocke and Yeaple’s (2007) findings,
which show that the most productive firms engage in cross-border mergers, while
relatively less efficient firms choose greenfield FDI, and the least efficient firms ex-
port or only serve the domestic market. Nocke and Yeaple (2007), in their model,
consider that the efficiency motive is the only motive for a merger, and ignore any
strategic motives. In Chapter 4, we introduced the market-concentration effect of
cross-border mergers by developing a two-country oligopoly model of product differ-
entiation, where firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity. Eventually,
we showed that in the presence of a higher market-concentration under merger, a
relatively less productive firm may prefer cross-border merger while a relatively more
productive firm may prefer either greenfield FDI or export, which contradicts the
findings of Nocke and Yeaple (2007).
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